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BOARD REFORMS WITH A JAPANESE TWIST: 
VIEWING THE JAPANESE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS WITH A DELAWARE LENS 
Carlo Osi*
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Japanese as a people have commonly been characterized as 
consensus-builders, holding extreme regard for hierarchy, stable, 1  non-
confrontational,2 and always one with the group (amae).3 They adhere to 
the notions of groupthink, familism,4 and rarely deviate from the ideals and 
structure of the group. Deviants are considered un-Japanese, social outcasts 
and protruding nails that ought to be hammered down to blend into the 
harmonious whole.5
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This article is the result of several years of study, research, and legal consultancy in Japan and the 
author’s perspective is as a third-person observer admiring the beauty, complexity, mystique and 
rigidity of Japanese corporate governance. 
 1. GREGORY JACKSON, RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY 
(RIETI), CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: WHAT JAPAN CAN LEARN FROM GERMANY (2002), 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/miyakodayori/050.html (The hallmarks of Japanese corporate stability 
were “concentrated ownership, no open market for corporate control, a central role for banks and 
bank-based financing, strong participation of employees in corporate management, stable 
employment and management strategy based on long-term organization building based on mutual 
trust and cooperation among stakeholders.”). 
 2. This is contrary to the mistaken notion, notably based on Japan’s World War II status as an 
aggressor, that the average Japanese is aggressive, violent, and confrontational. 
 3. BRUCE S. FEILER, LEARNING TO BOW: INSIDE THE HEART OF JAPAN 94 (2004) (“By 
becoming one with the group . . . the Japanese are able to display a strength beyond the scope of 
the individual.”) (quoting Takeo Doi). 
 4. The Japanese have a saying that “even if an extended family does not live together, parents 
and grandparents should live near enough to carry over a bowl of hot soup.” Theodore Bestor & 
Helen Hardacre, Contemporary Japan: Culture and Society, 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/at_japan_soc/. 
 5. Thomas Dillon, Hitting the Nail on the Head, Feb. 28, 2004, THE JAPAN TIMES, available 
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20040228td.html. See also MARTIN J. GANNON, 
UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL CULTURES: METAPHORICAL JOURNEYS THROUGH 28 NATIONS, 
CLUSTERS OF NATIONS, AND CONTINENTS 37 (2004). 
 Culturally unchanged for centuries, it is unsurprising 
that even within the Japanese boardroom directors carry the same traits and 
advocate the same philosophies. 
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Considered “the West’s exotic Other,” 6  behaviorally reserved and 
egalitarian Japan has a corporate history and governance structure that has 
fascinated and mystified scholars and practitioners alike for decades. Japan 
follows a radically different corporate mold from the West and yet has 
steadily increased its national wealth since the Second World War. 7 Its 
values, belief system and business perspectives are almost totally opposite 
that of the United States, but it remains the world’s second largest 
economy.8 Until the bubble burst of the early 1990s, the Japanese economy 
had been stable and steadily growing for forty years.9 Japanese corporate 
practice differed immensely from the Anglo-American model because: (1) 
it treated employees as family members;10 (2) the corporation was run for 
the benefit of all stakeholders; 11  (3) the keiretsu system of intertwined 
shareholdings was pervasive;12 (4) Main Banks (described below) were the 
primary source of financing and not institutional investors; 13 (5) hostile 
takeovers were uncommon; 14  and (6) mass layoffs did not generally 
occur.15
According to Christina Ahmadjian and Ariyoshi Okumura, post-war 
corporate Japan was illuminated by a set of interrelated stakeholders—
labor, management, capital, buyers, suppliers, and the state.
 Yet, one thing the U.S. and Japan shared was highly ubiquitous 
corporate scandals. 
16 The Japanese 
corporation relied primarily on cross-shareholding ownership, whereby a 
company owned a sizeable number of shares of other corporations within a 
specific group or “keiretsu”,17
                                                                                                                 
 6. Jeffrey Levick, Japan in the U.S. Press: Bias and Stereotypes, July 2005, http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/docs/121/press.pdf. 
 7. Economy Watch, Japan’s Economy, http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/ 
japan/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems 
of Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189 (2000) [hereinafter Shishido, 
Japanese Corporate Governance]. 
 10. TAKIE SUGIYAMA LEBRA, JAPANESE CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR: SELECTED READINGS 176 
(1986). 
 11. See generally Luke Nottage, Japanese Corporate Governance at a Crossroads: Variation 
in “Varieties of Capitalism”?, 27 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 255 (2001). 
 12. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: 
Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 
(1993). 
 13. Ichiro Kobayashi, Practitioner Note: The Interaction Between Japanese Corporate 
Governance and Relational Contract Practice, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 269, 301–03 (2005). 
 14. Robert Neff, Japan: Land of the Hostile Takeover? (Int’l Edition), BUS. WK., Mar. 30, 
2000, available at http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_11/b3672182.htm. 
 15. Peter B. Doeringer, Christine Evans-Klock & David G. Terkla, Hybrids Or Hodgepodges? 
Workplace Practices of Japanese and Domestic Startups in the United States, 51 IND. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 171, 176–77 (1998). 
 16. Christina L. Ahmadjian & Ariyoshi Okumura, Corporate Governance in Japan, in 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 130 (Christine A. Mallin, ed., 2006). 
 thus enabling it to source out needed inputs 
 17. Keiretsu is the Japanese corporate model whereby companies and banks owned large 
chunks of each other’s equity. It is comprised of networks of businesses whose financial base is a 
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and resources quickly, but at the same time limiting its market. A single 
bank that provided a majority of the funding (Main Bank)18 was likely at 
the center of the group and was deeply involved in all of the corporation’s 
financial transactions, and was revered for this reason.19 This Main Bank, 
due to its dual role as lender and owner, had significant control over the 
policy and operations of the company by deploying its employees as 
corporate directors or officers. 20  This effectively resulted in stable 
shareholding, passivity amongst institutional investors, and a relatively 
weak capital market.21
Stability also occurred in corporate leadership and amongst rank-and-
file employees. In many corporations, the outgoing company president 
normally handpicked his successor.
 
22 Significantly, a lifetime employment 
system also emerged from a strong and unshaken belief that once 
employed, a male employee would forever be connected with the same 
company.23 This practice is still firmly rooted in corporate culture despite 
its applicability to a diminishing subset of the workforce. As late as October 
2005, some sectors still felt that the labor force must be prioritized and that 
retaining redundant employees fosters worker morale and instills loyalty.24 
To be sure, the “managerialist and employee-oriented cast to the Japanese 
firm has not been fundamentally eroded.”25
By the early 1990s, however, particularly with the unexpected burst of 
the bubble
 
26
                                                                                                                 
major bank where such companies typically own stakes of each other as a natural defense against 
untoward external threats and for mutual security. It is a quid pro quo arrangement: I hold your 
shares, you hold mine and we will both be protected from any hostile takeover attempt. 
 18. The Main Bank relationship is the long-term and stable relationship between a corporation 
and the bank that chiefly finances it. 
 19. Thayer Watkins, The Keiretsu of Japan, available at http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/ 
keiretsu.htm (“The general structure of the keiretsu is an association of companies formed around 
a bank. They cooperate with each other and own shares of each other’s stock.”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Makoto Toda & William McCarty, Corporate Governance Changes in the Two Largest 
Economies: What’s Happening in the U.S. and Japan?, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 189, 
205  (2005). 
 23. In general, companies practiced welfare corporatism and had a tendency to protect their 
employees while seeking greater productivity from them, amounting to excessive work hours and 
occasional work-related suicides. Japanese workers have also suffered from karoshi or death by 
being overworked, and have also developed the socially acceptable habit of sleeping in public, on 
trains to work, during meetings and in other social events. 
 24. SYMPOSIUM REPORT, BUILDING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE 21ST CENTURY: AN 
AGENDA FOR JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 4 (Sept. 30 – Oct. 2, 2005), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/2005_jus_symposium_report.pdf. 
 25. Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?: What 
Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why 18 (Working Paper No. 202, Sept. 2004), available at 
http://swopec.hhs.se/eijswp/papers/eijswp0202.pdf. 
 and the financial crisis afterwards, corporate Japan began the 
 26. Japan Visitor, The Japanese Economy: A Look at the Post-Bubble Japanese Economy, 
http://www.japanvisitor.com/index.php?cID=374&pID=768&cName=Travel%20Basics&p (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2009) (“At the beginning of the 1990’s Japan was set to challenge the U.S. as the 
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long process of transformation. It began to open up to foreign ideas and 
experimentation. It was forced to listen to the outside world. Analogous to 
when U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry forced Japan to trade with the West 
by threatening to use his mighty Ships in July 1853 near Edo (now 
Tokyo), 27  Japan is gradually capitulating to Western-style corporate 
governance. More foreign shareholders are entering the securities market 
while aggressive mergers and hostile takeovers are slowly becoming 
commonplace.28 Shareholder activists—both Japanese and foreign-born—
are steadily chipping away at the deeply imbedded and unbending rigidities 
of Japan’s traditional corporate world.29 In the last few years, Japan has 
seen the decreasing role of the Main Bank in corporate, financial and 
shareholder affairs; 30  the prevalence of international or cross-border 
transactions; and the gradual ebbing of the paternalistic lifetime 
employment system.31 The practice of instituting an overly bloated board 
has been reconsidered and gradually altered.32 For example, the Shareholder 
Ombudsman was established in Osaka in 1996 to guard against bad 
boardroom practices by instituting high profile derivative suits and hefty 
settlements as deterrents. 33
                                                                                                                 
world’s number one economy. It was the time of the Gucci loafers and two Rolex watches worn 
on the one wrist . . . by 18 year-olds. The value of land was astronomical: it was calculated that 
the Imperial Palace grounds in Tokyo were worth more than California in its entirety. Based on 
land price, the real estate value of Japan was seven times that of the U.S. Then the bubble burst.”). 
 27. U.S. Department of State, The United States and the Opening to Japan, 1853, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/86550.htm (last visited on Feb. 9, 2009). 
 28. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile 
Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005). 
 29. Examples of these shareholder activists are convicted insider-trader and former high 
profile fund manager Yoshiaki Murakami, former Livedoor’s CEO Takafumi Horie, NY-based 
Steel Partners, CA-based Dalton Investments, and London-based The Children’s Investment Fund 
Management. See Joseph Chang, Shareholder Activism in Japan on the Rise, but Change will be 
Difficult, ICIS, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.icis.com/Articles/2007/11/05/9075289/shareholder-
activism-in-japan-on-the-rise-but-change-will-be-difficult.html; see also Kanako Takahara, 
Murakami: Investor Activist Turned Greenmailer?, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, July 20, 2007, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nb20070720a2.html; Takashi Betsui, Livedoor CEO, Other 
Top Execs Arrested, CNET NEWS, Jan. 23, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/Livedoor-CEO,-other-top-
execs-arrested/2100-1014_3-6029628.html; Christopher Hughes, More Perspiration than 
Inspiration, Apr. 3, 2009, BREAKINGVIEWS.COM, http://www.breakingviews.com/2009/04/03/ 
Shareholder%20activism.aspx. 
 30. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate 
Governance Through American Eyes, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 203 (1998). 
 31. Gregory Jackson, Employment Adjustment and Distributional Conflict in Japanese Firms, 
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
DIVERSITY 283 (Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, and Hideaki Miyajima, eds., 2007). 
 32. Matthew Senechal, Reforming the Japanese Commercial Code: A Step Towards an 
American-style Executive Officer System in Japan?, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 535, 536 (2003). 
 33. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 
369–70 (2001) [hereinafter West, Why Shareholders Sue]. 
 Stronger CEOs have also emerged with the 
decline of consensual decision-making of the board, and managers have 
shifted their focus to greater returns on shareholder investments. Recently 
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instituted accounting regulations have engendered transparency and further 
relaxed the once tight grip of cross-shareholding.34 Thus, for almost two 
decades, corporate governance has changed and evolved at an 
unprecedented rate—though still slow in terms of U.S. standards—which is 
something unexpected given the rigidity of Japanese society. Even former 
Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro (2000–2001) remarked, “the system and the 
ways of thinking which for 50 years have supported Japan’s astonishing 
development have now become inappropriate for the world we live in.”35
But not everything is changing. Despite the decrease in board size, 
independent directors are still a rarity and executive compensation has yet 
to achieve the same level as top-tier corporations in the United States. 
Except for notable exceptions such as the Nissan-Renault corporation 
headed by non-Japanese Carlos Ghosn,
 
36 Japanese corporations still have 
not imbibed the American corporate value of downsizing for the sake of 
shareholder interest. Even now, there are many “old guards” heading 
Japanese boardrooms who see no reason to drastically change their 
conventional “best practices” just to mirror U.S.-style governance. They 
clamor for the suppression of homegrown shareholder activists like 
Livedoor’s Takafumi Horie and Murakami Fund’s Yoshiaki Murakami,37
This article analyzes the evolution of the Japanese board of directors 
and pinpoints the factors that obstruct its development. Part II explains in 
detail the fundamental characteristics of Japanese corporate governance. 
Part III traces the evolution of the board of directors from the Meiji 
Restoration in the 1880s to the present day. Part IV tackles the question of 
whether the Japanese model creates a monitoring or managing board. Next, 
Part V explains who benefits from corporate management, while Part VI 
describes the essential criteria for being selected/elected as a director. Part 
VII illustrates the board reforms that have occurred. However, Part VIII 
emphasizes the remaining pervasiveness of grey directors. Part IX 
rationalizes that creeping, not sweeping or drastic, change is enveloping 
Japan. The article concludes in Part X that despite the legislative reforms 
and the optional adoption of the committee system, the Japanese board is 
 
and see hostile takeovers as destroying corporate “families” (by forcibly 
segregating children from their parents) or as almost criminal behavior. 
                                                                                                                 
 34. RALPH PAPRZYCKI & KYOJI FUKAO, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN JAPAN: 
MULTINATIONALS’ ROLE IN GROWTH AND GLOBALIZATION 6, 65–66, 244–45 (2008). 
 35. Dr. A. Hernádi, Japan’s Responses to Globalization (June 6, 2003), available at 
http://www.iem.ro/General/DATA/MRRomUng/AHERNADI.htm. 
 36. Carlos Ghosn is a Brazilian-born executive of Lebanese descent who trained in France. He 
is largely credited for successfully turning around Japanese car manufacturer Nissan. He currently 
is the CEO of the merged Nissan-Renault. See Executive Profile, Carlos Ghosn, BUS. WK., 
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=752
502&symbol=NSANY. 
 37. Martin Fackler, Corporate Raider Arrested in Japan (June 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/05/business/insider.php. 
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still not independent, but rather filled with insiders and grey directors. It 
remains a managing board with an extremely hindered monitoring role. 
Finally, this article prescribes remedies for Japanese corporate governance 
that may be effective within the next decade or so, provided that reformists 
increase in popularity and gradual changes are embraced by the public. The 
unmistakable grey hues permeating Japanese boards must be replaced by 
neutrally-toned independent directors, lest Japan becomes known as the 
new Potemkin Village. 
II. JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT A GLANCE 
The Japanese post-war period of corporate governance spanned from 
1945 to the late 1990s, with the bubble burst occurring in the very early 
1990s. During that time, for which Japanese post-war corporate governance 
has been typified as eccentric, slow to change, conservative and insular,38 
little changed within the corporate world. In what is informally known as 
the J-Form, Japanese firms traditionally relied on monitoring by large 
shareholders and banks. 39  Notably absent were hostile takeovers, 
managerial incentives, mass layoffs, and corporate restructurings. Stable 
shareholding, meager foreign shareholding, career or lifelong employment, 
omnipresence of Main Banks and cross-shareholding were the consistent 
corporate patterns during this period and they continue to a great degree 
today. These features were attractive to some scholars, who argued that 
Japanese-style corporate governance was a superior and viable alternative 
to the governance mechanisms available in the West.40
The Japanese system was and is dissimilar from the U.S. system in 
other ways. As one scholar notes, the “Japanese system is usually 
characterized as bank and relationship oriented and the U.S. system as 
(stock) market oriented.”
 
41  During the post-war period, there was little 
shareholder litigation,42
                                                                                                                 
 38. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of 
Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 343 (2005).  
 39. Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 8 
(1990). 
 40. Ushering the pre-bubble concept of Pax Japonica, which some have thought could replace 
Pax America if not for the economic collapse in the early 1990s. See Etsuo Abe, What is 
Corporate Governance? The Historical Implications, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN 1, 6 (Robert Fitzgerald & Etsuo Abe, eds., 2004). 
See also Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Opening Up Japan, ASIA MEDIA, Oct. 19, 2004, 
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=16056 (last visited on Apr. 14, 2009). 
 41. Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of 
Japan and the United States, 102 J. POL. ECON. 510, 510–11 (1994). 
 no rationale for takeover activities, and no impetus 
 42. Less than twenty shareholder suits were filed between 1950 and 1990. See Mark D. West, 
The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 
1436, 1438 (1994). See also R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of 
Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 269, 306–07 (2002) (“[T]he threat was so minimal that 
directors and officers insurance, a standard insurance product in the United States, was not 
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to challenge those sitting in the halls of corporate power. The residual 
owners of the company were regarded with little importance. Moreover, 
corporations systematically limited the duration of their annual shareholder 
meetings to a little less than thirty minutes, ostensibly to prevent 
shareholders from running wild. 43  The limitation was also designed to 
forestall numerous questions or issues that could stir up controversy.44
A. CROSS-SHAREHOLDING 
 The 
unique characteristics of Japanese corporate governance that existed during 
the post-war period still play a vital role today. 
Cross-shareholding is a distinct feature of the corporate system and is 
characterized by the web-like mutual shareholding structure prevalent 
among companies that helped maintain stability in post-war Japan. The 
development of this system has resulted in the following: (1) the illiquidity 
of equity markets; (2) protection of businesses from hostile takeovers; (3) 
passivity of shareholders; and (4) corporate management indifference to 
shareholders’ interests.45 Cross-shareholding is the clear result of groupism, 
in which Japanese firms exhibit a predilection to “cluster themselves into 
groupings of affiliated companies that extend a broad spectrum of 
markets.”46 According to Takahiro Yasui, it was originally developed in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s with the purpose of raising capital while 
preventing hostile acquisitions. 47  It has contributed to the relatively 
concentrated ownership structure of Japanese companies. Presently, cross-
shareholding is unwinding as more foreign stockholders have bought into 
the shares of Japanese companies.48
                                                                                                                 
introduced into Japan until 1990, and even then only for risks of exposure to lawsuits overseas. 
Director’s and officer’s insurance for threats arising in Japan was not sold until 1994.”). 
 43. Some managers viewed shareholders as disturbances, if not a nuisance, who need not be 
spoken to and should generally be ignored. 
 44. As to be explained later, management used Yakuza gangsters and their own employees 
through irrepressible clapping sessions to suppress legitimate shareholder voice during 
shareholder meetings. See Shareholders Meetings: Big Police Presence Checks ‘Sokaiya’, THE 
JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, June 30, 2000, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20000630a4.html 
[hereinafter Shareholders Meetings]; see also discussion supra Part II.F. 
 45. Toru Umeda, Corporate Governance Reforms in Japan, 
http://www.icac.org.hk/ICAC/ACTIVITIES/leader/ppt/toru_e.ppt (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
 46. Michael L. Gerlach, Twilight of the Keiretsu? A Critical Assessment, in COMPARATIVE 
LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 379–81 (Kenneth L. Port ed., 1996). 
 47. Takahiro Yasui, Corporate Governance in Japan, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 129 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD] ed., 2001). 
 48. See generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, JAPAN: SELECTED ISSUES (2008), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08254.pdf. 
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B. THE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 
A Main Bank is a bank that provides loans to a company and at the 
same time holds that company’s stock. 49  A typical Japanese company 
develops a long-term relationship with a Main Bank and depends on it for 
support and financing.50 It is the company’s largest creditor and often its 
largest shareholder.51 It normally holds the largest exposure, among private 
financial institutions, of loans made to a firm.52 As it also holds equity, it is 
expected to monitor the company but to intervene only when things go 
wrong. 53  Since a Main Bank intervenes only when the company is 
distressed, this has been described as “contingent governance”; the board 
enjoys a high degree of autonomy in normal times but will defer to the 
Main Bank in abnormal situations.54
Banks gladly serve as Main Banks because their client-companies are 
certain to utilize them for transactional purposes, earning the banks fees and 
profits through deposits, a monopoly in employees’ salary accounts, and 
interest rates.
 
55  To ensure a healthy return on Main Bank investments, 
current or former bank employees are placed in key managerial positions or 
on the boards of directors of these firms.56 Perhaps even more important is 
the role of the Main Bank when one of its keiretsu members becomes 
financially distressed; because the Main Bank has loan and equity 
exposures, it will often come to the company’s rescue.57 Main Banks have 
even dabbled in the negotiations of a company’s debts and its possible 
restructuring.58 This results in rampant inefficiency, where regularly failing 
companies are kept afloat due to the Main Bank’s intervention and 
patriarchy. 59
                                                                                                                 
 49. Main Banks not only finance the companies, but they also own them in part by buying into 
these companies, particularly if they belong to the same keiretsu. They also serve as underwriters 
of bond issues. See Ahmadjian & Okumura, supra note 16, at 130–31. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Mark J. Loewenstein, What Can We Learn From Foreign Systems?: Stakeholder 
Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1673, 1687 (2002). 
 52. Id. 
 53. MASAHIKO AOKI & HUGH T. PATRICK, THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS 
RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES 3–5 (1994). Main Banks 
naturally acted as monitors of the corporations they owned because they needed to guarantee that 
the funds lent were invested well or attained their original purpose. 
 54. See Yasui, supra note 47, at 123–24 (“The governance structure of Japanese corporations 
is often characterised as ‘contingent governance’ in which company insiders retain effective 
control of management as long as the firm performs well, but once performance deteriorates, the 
control is taken away and they are subject to severe sanctions such as the forced liquidation of the 
corporation.”).  
 55. See generally Takeo Hoshi, Evolution of the Main Bank System in Japan, in BANKING IN 
JAPAN 159–85 (William M. Tsutsui, ed., 1999). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 They are treated like lost spoiled children whose parents 
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stubbornly believe that a turnaround is forthcoming; hence, the Main 
Bank’s monitoring and disciplining role.60
In the late 1980s, banks and other financial institutions held about 40% 
of Japanese publicly listed shares.
 
61 Although it was illegal for any single 
bank to hold a stake in a company greater than 5%, banks coordinated with 
closely affiliated banking institutions, insurance companies and other 
financial companies to sidestep the law.62 The law was easily circumvented 
to perpetually put companies in the hands of a Main Bank or at least a 
friendly third party. These Main Banks were also boosted by the 
coordinated assistance and protection provided by the Ministry of Finance, 
which made certain that poor performers were ably supported. Since the 
Ministry of Finance had their support, banks frequently took high lending 
risks with their clients.63
Main Banks have gradually been replaced by a more capital market-
dependent system.
 This, among other interrelated reasons, would later 
take down some of the behemoth Main Banks. 
64  The Main Bank system “has gradually become 
incompatible with the changing economic environment.”65 However, Main 
Banks have not ceased being the main financing core of keiretsu 
companies.66 “It would be more accurate to suggest that the main banks 
have shifted from performing their insurance function through active 
rescues to relying on passive life-support operations.”67 While there is a 
general unwinding of the old Main Banks, some have just merged with 
other banks to form “megabanks” 68
                                                                                                                 
 60. See Yasui, supra note 47, at 123, 131–32. 
 61. Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for 
Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 16–17 (2000). 
 62. Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United 
States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1939–41 (1993). 
 63. See generally Gregory D. Ruback, Master of Puppets: How Japan’s Ministry of Finance 
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(2002). 
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REFORMING JAPANESE CAPITALISM 127–129 (2006). 
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 that continue to play a key, though 
often no longer dominating role in the affairs of companies. Some of the 
Main Banks have gone out of business, but many still exist and continue to 
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perform lending and financing functions. 69  They are reinventing 
themselves, “are rushing to unwind their cross-shareholdings,” 70  and 
continue to play key roles, albeit more subdued and less interventionist 
ones.71
The Japanese have learned their lessons well on the failures of the Main 
Bank system,
 
72 though it took decades, a lot of flack from the public, and 
necessitated a very firm government hand. After the bubble burst in the 
early 1990s and the decade-long economic stagnation, the Main Bank 
system was blamed and solutions were formulated.73 While the Main Banks 
were correctly identified as the source of the problem, the central solution 
of various Japanese administrations in the 1990s was to bail out banks, 
lower interest rates, and offer massive fiscal stimulus packages among other 
things.74 All of these plans failed in Japan, as they wasted large amounts of 
capital in an attempt to prop up a flawed banking system without making 
any real substantive changes.75 In the late 1990s, Japanese banks still kept 
loans extended to “zombie” companies on their balance sheets instead of 
disclosing them and writing them off.76
In 2003, after more than a decade of stagnation, Japan’s government, 
headed by reformist Junichiro Koizumi, instituted a set of complete and 
“merciless audits”
 
77
                                                                                                                 
 69. VOGEL, supra note 66, at 127–29. 
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 72. Hugh T. Patrick, The Relevance of Japanese Finance and Its Main Bank System, in THE 
JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING 
ECONOMIES 353–408 (Masahiko Aoki and Hugh T. Patrick, eds., 1994). 
 73. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan sees U.S. Repeating its Mistakes on Bank Plan, 
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 13, 2009, at 1. 
 74. Id. There are clearly similarities between the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s and the 
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to the United States? See Anthony Randazzo, Return of the Living Dead: What the U.S. Can Learn 
from Japan’s Failed Experiment with “Zombie Businesses”, REASONONLINE.COM, Dec. 17, 2008, 
http://www.reason.com/news/show/130626.html. 
 75. See Tabuchi, supra note 73. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 of the banking system under the so-called Takenaka 
Plan. Heizo Takenaka, who led the government’s financial reforms, brought 
to light the real extent of the banking crisis. With a firm, unrelenting 
approach, the banks finally disclosed and wrote off their bad loans after 
three years. In the end, the government nationalized one big bank, offended 
many bank shareholders, and allowed some banks to collapse and fail under 
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their own weight.78 It is believed that “was a turning point in the banking 
crisis” because “[a]fter that, markets finally trusted the banks again.”79
C. LIFELONG EMPLOYMENT AND THE SENIORITY WAGE SYSTEM 
 
Lifelong or career-long employment, which is applicable only to males, 
has several key elements. First, the individual is hired directly from school 
instead of being hired in the open market.80 Second, the individual is hired 
based on his general characteristics and abilities, rather than for a 
specialized or particular skill. 81  Third, he is expected to remain in the 
company for the length of his career, and in return, he can expect not to be 
fired or discharged. 82  Fourth, an employee chooses a company, not a 
profession. An employee will ordinarily refuse to job hop. 83  Career 
employment acts as a social safety net, covering everything from health 
care to housing loans to retirement funds.84
Under the Seniority-Wage System, a worker’s salary is not based on his 
performance, but on the length of his service to the company.
 
85 Employees 
are generally paid a minimally sufficient amount from the start of their 
careers until they reach 50. When they turn 50, their salaries grow very 
quickly. By the mandatory retirement age of 60 or 65 (depending on the 
corporation), they get a large bonus plus a reliable pension that they can use 
in their old age.86 The practices of career employment and seniority wages 
are waning87 and have become difficult to sustain in recent years.88
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D. BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Directors in Japan are commonly classified as either insiders or 
outsiders; outside directors are further classified as either grey or 
independent. Directors tend to be lethargic, because independent outside 
directors are kept in extremely small numbers. There is little board control 
over the actions and decisions of the company president. Board decisions 
are likely to be rubber-stamped,89 and board meetings are infrequent—all of 
which results in a rather dysfunctional governance system. Boards likewise 
tend to be very large, at least when compared to Western standards. For 
example, as recently as 1990, Sony Corporation’s board had thirty-six 
directors (which increased to thirty-eight in 1997)90 while Nippon Steel had 
forty-two. 91
E. GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS HEGEMONY 
 Many of these directors were insiders; former corporate 
executives or employees who were promoted to director status. 
Strong government-business ties exist in corporate Japan, allowing for a 
cozy business relationship between bureaucrats—with strong emphasis on 
public works ministry bureaucrats—and businessmen. Government 
agencies and businesses form a symbiotic relationship in which they 
exchange favors and business deals. 92  Though not necessarily implying 
corruption, a government bureaucrat working closely with some high-
moneyed industries can be assured that upon his retirement from 
government, a comfy executive position in a company with the sought-after 
perquisites awaits him—something like an “Old Boy” network.93 Convoy 
Capitalism—the intervention by the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of 
Japan in dying, inefficient or “zombie” banks and borrowers by bleeding 
successful Japanese corporations, also plays a key role in the government-
business hegemony.94
F. THE SOKAIYA NUISANCE 
 
Beyond being a country highly concerned with formal courtesies and 
subtleties, Japan is, on the other extreme, well-known for organized crime. 
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 92. See generally Ulrike Schaede, The “Old Boy” Network and Government-Business 
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Yakuza organizations have ruled the country for a considerable period.95 
They sprung from feudal origins, and consisted of the original protectors of 
the village, masterless samurais (ronin), town servants, peddlers and even 
excessive gamblers.96
Sôkaiya, literally meaning “general meeting operators,” is a unique 
Japanese form of extortion practiced by the Yakuza and peddled in the 
corporate halls. The Sôkaiya are gangster corporate racketeers. They have 
also been known as “‘financial racketeers,’ ‘general meeting mongers,’ 
‘black gentlemen in the shadow[s],’ and ‘rent-a-thugs.’”
 In the corporate world, they have been reincarnated. 
97  Their modus 
operandi is simple: they deploy members or operatives during a 
stockholders’ meeting and employ an agenda that depends on whether they 
have been paid off. Their presence effectively frightens stockholders from 
coming forward with their proposals or actively pushing for reforms. They 
act as deterrents to stockholders otherwise resolved to participate in the 
decision-making process, and ensure that the meeting will run smoothly. 
These corporate racketeers use threats, intimidation and other scare tactics 
to keep the meetings short, empty, ritualistic and meaningless.98
The Yakuza achieve their ends by systematically and illegally obtaining 
embarrassing evidence on company leaders, blackmailing them in exchange 
for keeping such disparaging information from the public or the 
shareholders.
 
99 Such information may be about tax evasion, mistresses, the 
lack of safety guidelines in their plants, or other unsavory information about 
the company or its officers.100 Many corporations have used racketeers to 
keep shareholder meetings brief and infrequent, occurring once a year for 
only twenty to thirty minutes. Anything beyond that is considered long and 
unacceptable. The Sôkaiya have also been paid to scare away shareholder 
activists or ordinary stockholders from raising any issues,101
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 no matter how 
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relevant or material to the company. They have likewise taken seemingly 
legitimate forms by becoming corporate insiders, company consultants and 
advisers. 102  In essence, however, the Sôkaiya attend meetings for three 
reasons: for corporate blackmail, to manage shareholder meetings, and to 
use violence if necessary.103
G. THE GRADUAL DEMISE OF, AND RECENT CHANGES IN, 
TRADITIONAL JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The burst of the otherwise stable bubble economy signaled the 
diminution, if not the eventual demise, of these key elements of Japanese 
corporate governance. Japan’s traditional strengths that led to its 40-year 
stability would turn out to be its critical weaknesses. After the bubble burst, 
there was almost a decade-and-a-half-long regression of the economy, 
highlighted by low economic growth, job insecurity, 104  unexpected 
bankruptcies, bad loans, national anxiety, and a shift of industrial 
operations, primarily to China.105
During these times, Japanese companies shifted from bank-based 
financing to capital market financing, resulting in a smaller percentage of 
bank debts and the eventual disappearance of the Main Bank 
stranglehold.
 
106 Companies were able to raise more funds from places like 
London and New York than from Tokyo.107 As a result, cross-shareholding 
and the keiretsu system gave way to greater foreign equity ownership. 
Banks, experiencing liquidity problems stemming from the failure of 
Japanese companies to repay their loans, and from revisions in accounting 
regulations mandating that shares be reported at market, needed to sell most 
of their shares. Foreign investors who wanted to get a foothold in imperial 
Japan bought the shares peddled by the banks.108 Foreign share ownership 
quickly rose from 6% in 1992 to a staggering 18% in 2003, and to 28% in 
2007. 109
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 Meanwhile, shareholding by financial institutions dropped to 
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approximately 35% in 2002. 110  Shareholding by commercial banks, or 
specifically Main Banks, declined to just 6% in 2004 from 16% in 1992.111 
Corporate share ownership decreased to just 24% by 2004.112
In 2006, one scholar remarked, “There is a shift underway in Japan 
about the role of shareholders and the importance of getting return on 
equity . . . one of the beneficial outcomes is a heightened awareness on the 
part of CEOs, investors and employees of the radical changes that are 
occurring in the Japanese investment environment.”
 
113
In most listed companies in Japan, a sizeable portion of the stock remains 
permanently in ‘safe’ hands, thus assuring continued control by 
management. Shareholdings are fragmented between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders.’ Insiders are small circles of executives and financiers often 
connected with the issuer’s enterprise group. Outsiders consist primarily 
of individual investors, and to a lesser degree, of investment advisory 
firms, insurance companies, banks or other groups and foreign firms. 
Outsiders occupy a position analogous to second-class creditors; they 
receive dividends, smaller but more consistent than in the U.S., and capital 
gain treatment when they sell, but have no real voice over the way 
corporate affairs are conducted. The insiders are in charge, not by virtue of 
their position as shareholders, but as a product of the multiplicity of their 
roles in the firm; they are creditors, shareholders, lifetime employees, 
management and business partners.
 This is quite 
interesting considering that in 1983—during the time when the United 
States was experiencing an influx of mergers and acquisitions, when the 
U.S. equity base was increasingly held by institutional investors, and when 
Martin Lipton of the renowned New York firm Wachtell Lipton Rosen & 
Katz LLP was developing his shareholder rights plan or the “poison pill”— 
it was said that: 
114
The contrast between this pronouncement about Japan in 1983 and the 
gradual changes that have appeared in the last few years only confirm the 
fact that change can and will occur even in such a highly traditional and 
conservative society, though it will take much time and persuasion. Belated 
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as they were, the Western-style changes in corporate governance were 
direly needed for Japan to maintain its position as the world’s second 
largest economy. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS115
The evolution of the present-day Japanese board of directors can be 
traced all the way back to the 1870s Meiji Restoration
 
116 when authority 
was centrally reposed to the Emperor.117 Around that time, the state decided 
it would develop its industrial capabilities to catch up, if not match, the 
military strength of European and American colonial powers.118 It wanted 
to transform Japan from a peasant economy into an industrial power by 
introducing Western technology. 119  Fearful of possible occupation, yet 
harboring its own geographic ambitions, Japan favored companies that were 
directly involved in warfare.120 The state played a critical monitoring role to 
ensure that these companies were well run, developed good technology, 
were subsidized if needed, and delivered the required supplies to the 
government. 121 The interventionist-minded state coordinated the business 
and affairs of vast enterprises, especially in times of crisis.122
The powerful men behind the restored Meiji government not only 
wanted to assure their hold to power but also, more importantly, feared 
Western subjugation. They knew Japan was too economically weak and 
agriculturally dependent to compete with Europe and the United States, so 
the country would need to co-opt Western concepts and laws. Under this 
theme, in 1877, the government invited German scholar and professor 
Hermann Roesler to serve as legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry in 
Tokyo.
 
123  He began by revising Japan’s treaty with Korea. 124
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 By April 
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1881, he began drafting the country’s commercial code.125 Little is known 
of his methodology on drafting the code except that he typically worked 
alone and “undertook a worldwide study of commercial law.”126 Almost 
three years after he started, he submitted a completed draft to the 
government consisting of 1,133 articles divided into four books on such 
topics as “Commerce . . . , Maritime Commerce, Bankruptcy, and 
Commercial Litigation.”127 Based largely on the German code and practice, 
the commercial code included governance provisions that were anti-
shareholder128 in nature. It was implemented in 1899,129
In the late 1890s and early 1900s, businesses (military, industrial and 
agricultural)
 and subsequently 
revised many times thereafter. 
130 did not have a formalized “board of directors” as we know it 
today—they were either loosely organized or boards were comprised 
entirely of government officials and appointees.131 These businesses were 
mainly composed of individual entrepreneurs, groups or families who 
managed thousands of workers, and were supervised and financed by the 
state through its organs. 132  It is even said that some members of the 
Samurai, who by then were fading into obsolescence, went into business 
and secured government contracts. 133
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 These businesses, known as joint 
stock companies, were established largely as joint ventures between 
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investor groups or business promoters due to the underdevelopment of the 
stock market.134 Each business or investor group leader, called a “boss,” 
nominally assumed a seat in the “board of directors” to act as a business 
representative and maintain the balance of power.135 As such, they were 
“owner-controlled firms.”136
These boss-directors, even if they owned and controlled the firm, were 
busy with other companies and delegated management to administrative 
staff.
 
137 They did not manage the corporate entity directly and were mainly 
concerned with how secure their investments were. As a result, Japanese 
scholars disagree on whether pre-war corporate governance can be likened 
to the Anglo-Saxon model, since (1) boss-directors did not manage firms as 
directors; and (2) investor groups eventually sold their shares and thus 
helped to disperse ownership. 138  However, the boss-directors did not 
effectively monitor management and the dispersal of ownership was very 
brief.139 By World War I, ownership and authority were again concentrated 
in the hands of the few. 140
Another attribute of these companies was that their well-connected 
owners cemented exceptional ties with the powers-that-be in the 
government, which is comparable to today’s comfy government-business 
liaison.
 Thus, Japan’s pre-war corporate governance 
structure did not reflect the U.S. model. 
141 This explains how these businesses were able to thrive through 
various wars, a totalitarian government in the 1930s,142
A third attribute was that these trading houses and companies 
considered their employees as family. Since they had to import technology 
for armament production, they spent much time and resources training 
employees.  These skilled laborers were provided with housing, good 
 foreign occupation, 
and economic downturns. 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See generally Atsushi Tokuda, The Origin of the Corporation in Meiji Japan (U. London, 
Working Paper No. DP21), http://www.cefims.ac.uk/documents/research-9.pdf. 
 135. Matao Miyamoto & Takeshi Abe, The Corporate Governance of Japanese Firms at the 
Early Stages of Industrialization: Osaka Cotton Spinning and Nippon Life Assurance, in THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN 10 (Robert 
Fitzgerald & Etsuo Abe, eds., 2004). 
 136. Id. at 10–28. The more important joint stock companies during that era were the Osaka 
Cotton Spinning Company (now Toyobo) founded in 1882, and Nippon Life Assurance 
established in Osaka in 1889.  See id. 
 137. Id. at 10, 20–21, 29. 
 138. Id. at 30. 
 139. JULIAN FRANKS, COLIN MAYER & HIDEAKI MIYAJIMA, EVOLUTION OF OWNERSHIP: THE 
CURIOUS CASE OF JAPAN 8–9 (Preliminary First Draft, Mar. 25, 2007), 
http://www.hbs.edu/units/bgie/pdf/miyajima.pdf. 
 140. See Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: 
Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 657 (2001) [hereinafter 
Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law]. 
 141. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Value of Prominent Directors: Lessons in 
Corporate Governance from Transitional Japan, Nov. 1999, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
Delivery.cfm/991103100.pdf?abstractid=192388. 
 142. FRANKS, MAYER & MIYAJIMA, supra note 139, at 1. 
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benefits and treated as familial members to encourage them to stay with the 
company. This paternalistic pattern would continue for over a century.143
During the 1920s and from 1935 to 1945, Japan’s expansionist 
ambitions, coupled with its state interventionist approach, were in full 
swing.
 
144 It again heavily supported and subsidized companies aiding the 
war effort. These cartel-driven, tightly-held companies145 were known as 
zaibatsu, large family-controlled conglomerates with holding companies 
that supplied government requirements and other products and services. 
Due to their ties with politicians, zaibatsu umbrella companies cornered 
government-business relations. By the mid-1930s, the banks became the 
largest supplier of capital for zaibatsu companies. 146  The zaibatsu 
emphasized growth through reinvestment of profits back into the company. 
Equity shares were typically illiquid, as they were generally restricted to 
zaibatsu family members. 147 The zaibatsu holding companies supervised 
subsidiaries through budget control and managerial allocations, authorized 
their financing, intervened in conflicts and disciplined them.148 The pre-war 
zaibatsu model was a form of “non-market-based governance.” 149  As a 
result of the war efforts, the government concentrated planning and 
administration of large companies to a central planning agency, which 
ordered existing boards of directors to seek government approval before 
implementing fundamental corporate changes or issuing debt or equity.150 
For example, in 1939, boards were prohibited from declaring dividends and 
reassigned this right to the central planning agency.151
In 1943, Japan ushered in the Munitions Corporation Law, a law that 
substantially altered corporate governance.
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Postan, eds., 1983). 
 144. FRANKS, MAYER & MIYAJIMA, supra note 139, at 3, 15, 22. 
 145. Haruhito Takeda, Corporate Governance in the Inter-War Zaibatsu, in THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND GREAT BRITAIN 59, 62–63 (Robert 
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 146. See generally HIDEMASA MORIKAWA, ZAIBATSU: THE RISE AND FALL OF FAMILY 
ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN JAPAN (1992). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Takeda, supra note 145, at 68–71. 
 149. Id. at 71. 
 150. WALTER LAFEBER, THE CLASH: U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
162–63 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1998). 
 151. Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law, supra note 140, at 660. 
 Corporate executives in 
 152. The state could ratify company elections and also fire the president. On the other hand, the 
company president could make decisions that were supposed to be made in a shareholders meeting 
without the shareholders actually meeting. In short, the president assumed the power of the 
shareholders. Tetsuji Okazaki, The Japanese Firm Under the Wartime Planned Economy, in THE 
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Munitions Companies were no longer the agents of the shareholders, as was 
stated in the Commercial Code.153 They became responsible for attaining 
manufacturing targets as dictated by the government or their industrial 
groups. Instead of shareholder-elected directors, “selection of directors was 
to be made independently of the shareholders; instead management 
experience in the firm would be the chief criterion for appointment. Profits 
were no longer to belong solely to the shareholders, but should be allocated 
to workers, shareholders and directors.” 154  Nearing the end of the war, 
about 700 firms were designated as Munitions Companies. 155  Each 
company was assigned a bank by the Ministry of Finance that provided the 
funds they needed to expand production (much like a Main Bank).156 These 
banks were required to provide the funds. They were also encouraged, but 
not required, to monitor the affairs of the entity (similar to a Main Bank’s 
“contingent monitoring”).157
After Japan’s devastating defeat in 1945, it was occupied by the 
Americans for seven years. “The final attacks on Japan . . . destroyed 
production capacity, infrastructure and housing; disrupted supplies from 
former trading partners in Asia . . . . Production collapsed, jobs and incomes 
disappeared and hunger was rampant.”
 
158 Because the country fell apart, 
people had to work cohesively. Desperate for food and jobs, they 
steadfastly clung to each other. But the old bureaucrats who managed 
Japan’s pre-war and wartime economy did not disappear; with a dearth of 
individuals who could run the devastated country, they were tapped by the 
Americans to fashion out policy reforms.159 This promoted the continuity of 
government patriarchy as a policy that emphasized state intervention when 
necessary or desirable (later on manifesting itself in the deployment of 
Ministry officials as board directors). 160  Many of the features of the 
Japanese economy, such as bank-based financing, were also left in place. 
But the American-led effort of “economic democratization”161
                                                                                                                 
JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 372 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore, 
eds., 1994). 
 153. Id. at 462. 
 154. See ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 64. 
 155. YOSHIRO MIWA, STATE COMPETENCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN JAPAN 64 (2004). 
 156. Akira Hara, Wartime Controls, in ECONOMIC HISTORY OF JAPAN 1914-1955: A DUAL 
STRUCTURE 276 (Takafusa Nakamura and Konosuke Odaka, eds., 2003). 
 157. Id. 
 158. ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 7. 
 159. Indiana University Northwest, Japanese Economic Takeoff After 1945, 
http://www.iun.edu/~hisdcl/h207_2002/jecontakeoff.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). 
 160. The underpinnings of post-war Japanese corporate governance—notably long-term 
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government-business connections, and political protection for favored clients—clearly all were the 
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 161. See ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 81. 
 broke up and 
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dismantled the concentrated ownership structure of major zaibatsu holding 
companies such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda and Fuji through 
the Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947.162
The American occupation regime clearly had a reformist approach as to 
where Japanese corporate law should go. Because the legal division of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo was 
dominated by lawyers, judges and scholars with training from the 
University of Illinois and Chicago-based experience (headed by Lester 
Salwin and Irving Eisenstein), SCAP rewrote the Japanese Commercial 
Code with an obvious inclination towards Illinois corporate law.
 
163  It 
specifically emphasized shareholder rights as opposed to the German-
inspired 1899 Japanese Commercial Code or Law No. 48, which German 
scholar and professor Hermann Roesler helped draft. The Illinois law-
leaning164 draft revision immediately drew antagonistic reactions from the 
Japanese as they have long viewed active shareholders as troublemakers.165 
When the Japanese Diet passed the final draft in May 1950 (1950 
Commercial Code), shareholders rights were heightened, 166  an evolved 
board of directors was formally established, 167  the concept of director 
accountability was introduced, and the power of the statutory auditor was 
reduced.168
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(1953). 
 166. The 1950 revision gave the shareholders a voice, regulated potential conflicts of interest, 
and required periodic disclosure of financial data. See West, The Puzzling Divergence of 
Corporate Law, supra note 163, at 545. 
 167. Directors shall be appointed at the general meeting of shareholders. SHŌNŌ, art. 254, para 
1. Boards shall be composed of a minimum of three members (SHŌNŌ, art. 255), whose terms 
shall not be more than two years. SHŌNŌ, art. 256, para 1. 
 168. See West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law, supra note 163, at 545. 
 The final draft was a mix of Illinois law, old German concepts 
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and Japanese norms; it was generally unpopular. 169 The Americans also 
permitted unionization,170 which further entrenched workers and made them 
immovable. Threatened, too, with the specter of frivolous shareholder 
lawsuits, the Japanese pressured the Americans to make it more expensive 
for lawsuits to be filed.  The required bond was subsequently so 
expensive,171 that it chilled shareholder litigation until its revision in 1993, 
when the filing fee was reset to a mere 8,200 yen (about $82.33).172
It was a different story when the Americans left in 1952. By then, the 
former zaibatsu companies had merely recombined into looser federations 
(keiretsu), where bank financing, mutual assistance, government 
connections and patriarchy played key roles, thus mirroring the dynamics of 
their zaibatsu predecessors.
 
173  The zaibatsu conglomerates resurrected 
themselves through the keiretsu companies’ web-like cross-shareholding 
pattern, minus the dominant families’ ownership monopoly.174 Admittedly, 
however, the de-concentration and anti-trust activities of the Americans 
weakened the business concentration fabric. 175  The holding company 
structure of the zaibatsu companies and the investments of the privileged 
zaibatsu families were successfully discontinued.176
When the Americans left and the Japanese bureaucrats were placed in 
charge of implementing the 1950 Commercial Code, they interpreted and 
administered it their way. As a result, there was a large gap between the 
black-letter provisions of the 1950 Commercial Code and actual practice. 
Since there was general opposition towards the American-made, Illinois 
law-leaning corporate governance structure, there was an informal protest 
against the 1950 Commercial Code.
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 Instead of boards monitoring the 
2009] Board Reforms with a Japanese Twist 347 
company officers and charting strategic directions, directors nominally 
performed such functions. They made the directorship the highest position a 
loyal employee could ever aspire to and filled the board with as many 
members as possible. 178
IV. A MONITORING OR MANAGING BOARD? 
 Since the board was now composed of senior 
managers, it did not normally sanction its members. The Japanese erased 
the board’s monitoring function not by amending the law but by indirectly 
circumventing it. They subtly turned the U.S. creation into a Japanese one. 
According to Martin Lipton and Jay Lorsch, the ideal U.S. board should 
be a monitoring board with three important committees composed solely of 
independent directors.179 The board’s role is to select, evaluate and reward 
CEOs.180 It must also ensure that corporate officers comply with federal and 
state laws.181 In addition, it should approve corporate strategy, assess this 
strategy, and undergo CEO and board performance evaluation.182 Moreover, 
Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen illustrate that the monitoring function is 
embedded in the separation of ownership and control, and in which the 
residual risk bearers are separate from the ones who are going to make 
corporate policies.183
The post-war Japanese board model is a managing board, which is 
drastically different from the framework described by Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992), Fama and Jensen (1983), or Berle and Means (1932). Most of the 
directors are managing directors (jugyoin kenmu torishimariyaku or 
directors functioning as employees of the company). There is virtually no 
distinction between execution and supervision. Decision-making and 
monitoring functions congruently overlap.
 
184  This board can even be 
described as an operations board. Directors, once elected, are independently 
responsible to shareholders for managing the company. Thus, once the 
board makes certain managerial decisions, the director responsible or 
assigned by the board must see to it that it is carried out.185
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 The board, as a 
body, must then oversee the assigned or appointed director. This is possible 
because the inside directors are promoted from within the corporate 
348 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
structure—middle management employees who see directorship as the 
pinnacle of their lifetime company service. In most cases, these inside 
directors continue to be employees of the corporation and receive both 
employee salary and director pay. 
Beyond these employees who become directors while retaining their 
worker status, the Main Bank, as the owner of huge numbers of shares, 
sends executives to occupy directorship positions. 186 Other stakeholders, 
particularly customers and business partners who also own significant 
holdings, are likewise represented in the board. These “shareholders [who] 
are usually affiliated companies in the same corporate group . . . or 
important business counterparts of the company . . . sometimes send their 
personnel to the board as directors or statutory auditors, which proves a 
means to control management directly.”187
There are certain advantages for the Japanese board model. It gives 
sufficient incentives for employees to be loyal to the company, since the 
possibility of becoming a director is not far-fetched. As board members 
actively manage employees, they know the company well and can chart 
strategic growth and optimal use of its resources. Japanese managers may 
complain that the U.S. board model is full of independent directors who are 
elected to promote shareholders’ interests and increase share value, the 
consequence of which is that these outsiders may not know much about 
running the company.
 Instead of a separation between 
ownership and control, there is a marriage between the residual owners and 
the corporate controllers. They own it, they control it. 
188
But there are inherent flaws in the managing board model. First, it tends 
to entrench the company president and other officers. Many board insiders 
are still company employees and therefore subservient to the president. 
They will not be able to monitor his activities well enough, and even if they 
do find something amiss, they will neither have the courage nor temerity to 
question it. This echoes the point of UCLA Professor Bainbridge when he 
found that U.S. directors tended not only to be friends or colleagues of the 
CEO, but also people beholden to him.
 The ranks-to-director approach also leads to 
stability and harmony with the organization. 
189
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 The CEO’s accountability is even 
more dramatic in Japan where the director position is subordinate to the 
president. Second, as there is seniority within the employees’ ranks, there is 
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a similar seniority and rigid hierarchy within the directorship level. 
Younger employee-directors are inclined to view older employee-directors 
as their progenitors/senior officers and will bestow more reverence than 
monitoring. Concomitantly, the board is divided between senior members 
and junior directors, with the latter providing most of the employee 
functions as instructed by the board.190
Third, the company president is predisposed—as a result of the large 
board membership, which can be anywhere between 20 to 40 directors 
during any given year
 
191—to form a smaller, elitist committee of directors 
composed of himself and senior members of the board (jomu-kai).192
In post-war corporate Japan, if the word “monitoring” is mentioned, it 
is not associated with the board of directors. It is more related to the self-
interested role of the Main Bank, which is to monitor the business and 
affairs of the company, if not periodically at least. This monitoring role of 
the Main Bank is not shared by other stakeholders, who are simply free-
riders.
 The 
segregation between senior and junior board members, plus the 
establishment of a smaller senior executive committee, destroys any notion 
that the board is performing monitoring functions or acts in a collegial 
manner. Lastly, the management decisions by this elite committee are 
mechanically rubber-stamped by the bigger, all-inclusive board of directors 
since the younger directors essentially have no voice. 
193
V. MANAGED FOR WHOM? 
 
In post-war corporate Japan, corporations are primarily managed for the 
stakeholders. This includes employees, banks, suppliers, customers, 
business partners, the community and, in some respect, shareholders. 194 
This stakeholder-oriented model195
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 is quite different from the shareholder 
 195. This may mirror Lynn Stout’s theory of a Mediating Board. Professor Stout believes that 
boards should mediate with asset-specific groups as it is the directors’ duty to protect these other 
groups or stakeholders. Maximizing the value of corporate law requires maximizing all of the 
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commitments made by investors, managers, and other corporate constituencies.” Lynn A. Stout, 
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primacy model advocated in the United States. Some have described the 
Japanese type as an “employee-centered stakeholder model” and an 
“employee-sovereign firm”, but as Takashi Araki said in defending his 
home country’s system, “Japanese law resembles more the Anglo-Saxon 
shareholder-value model than the stakeholder model.” 196  However, he 
himself admits that there is a divergence between black-letter law and 
practice in that “law and reality often diverge. There has been a consensus 
among Japanese corporate law professors that, irrespective of the principles 
and theories stated in the corporate laws, in practice, larger companies are 
administered by the prioritization of the interests of employees.”197 Araki 
avers that it is actually a “practice-dependent stakeholder model,” with 
practice meaning the culture of managing directors, lifetime employees, 
focus on employee welfare, balancing of other stakeholders’ interests, and 
cross-shareholders’ interests.198
This model is essentially related to the Japanese “Company 
Community” model, which consists of “management, board members and 
core employees who share an identity as ‘company men’ . . . ‘company’ 
refers to the collective Company Community . . . [whose] members . . . owe 
their loyalty to both the Community itself and their fellow members” with 
“employees as the quasi-residual claimants.”
 In reality, beyond the statutory text, the role 
of management is not necessarily to increase the value of the shares and 
satisfy the passive shareholders. Rather, its critical task is to always balance 
corporate obligations with the interests of employees, suppliers, partners, 
customers and other stakeholders by allocating specific pieces of the 
corporate pie. 
199
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 But this Company 
 199. See Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 189, 202. Shishido further 
advocates that, despite certain differences, the U.S. and Japan “still maintain the same basic 
structure” and “nearly identical corporate legal systems,” that “Japanese corporate law is more 
loyal to shareholder ownership than American corporate law,” and that there exists “a mechanism 
to relieve oppressed minorities.”  Id. at 194, 195, 197, 201. These are not entirely accurate. It is 
true that Japan’s corporate law has been influenced tremendously by the U.S. since the latter 
revised its Commercial Code during the Occupation years. However, to say that both countries 
maintain the same basic structures is to stretch matters rather awkwardly. Japan has its own way 
of doing things which may stray from the bare recitals of black letter law. The board is dominated 
by the company president, is composed primarily of insiders, and sprinkled with grey directors. 
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Community, together with lifetime employment, has been declining in 
recent years as companies hire new staff on a short-term basis or as part-
time contractors instead of treating them as part of the corporate family. Not 
only due to global competition and the storm of M&A activities, younger 
Japanese white-collar workers have also refused to make the company the 
center of their lives and have subtly discarded corporate paternalism by 
shifting jobs200 or professions.201
Under the stakeholder-oriented model, the company has no choice but 
to see to it that the stakeholders are satisfied and happy with corporate 
performance. Specifically, stakeholders include: (a) employees and their 
lifetime employment guarantee system; (b) the Main Bank; (c) customers, 
other banks and business partners; and (d) the state’s strategically-placed 
retired or soon-to-retire ministry officials.
 
202 It is therefore not managed for 
shareholders other than the Main Bank and companies under the same 
keiretsu. In a way, because of the unique system in Japan, the corporation is 
managed for only those shareholders who have representatives sitting on 
the board. Individual shareholders and institutional investors are largely 
ignored. There are no mechanisms in place to communicate with 
unaffiliated shareholders, no shareholder dialogues or resolutions, and 
derivative suits are uncommon and deliberately expensive.203
VI. CRITERIA FOR BECOMING A JAPANESE DIRECTOR 
 Therefore, it 
is essential for a shareholder to gain a voice on the board to defend its 
interests. 
Japanese directors are elected by the shareholders at a general 
shareholder meeting. 204
                                                                                                                 
This is a far cry from the U.S. model. Japan’s loyalty to shareholder ownership is also no greater 
than the U.S. Japanese corporations’ loyalty to the insider shareholders (e.g. Main Bank, creditors, 
business partners, consumers) and such insiders’ positions. Moreover, companies did not care at 
all, until very recently, with domestic/unaffiliated shareholders and institutional shareholders. 
Even if there was a written way to assuage oppressed minorities, these non-insider shareholders 
have suffered inattention and disregard for decades. Shareholder proposals were relatively 
unknown to Japan for a very long time. Many companies orchestrated and scripted their annual 
shareholder meetings to stifle dissent and suppress opinion by instructing their employees to clap 
continuously when a shareholder raises a point, or hired and paid off the Sokaiya or corporate 
gangsters to intimidate courageous shareholders. See id. 
 200. Workers are shifting jobs even though leaving the company is considered a form of 
betrayal by older generations. 
 201. THE ECONOMIST, Sayonary, Salaryman, Jan. 5, 2008. Younger generations of Japanese 
workers are seeking “work-life balance.” Id. 
 202. Peter Lawley, Panacea or Placebo? An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Japanese 
Committee System Corporate Governance Law Reform, 9 ASIAN PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 105, 121 
(2007) (It “reflects the status quo of the corporate structure in Japan whereby the directors of a 
company represent various divisions of the company.”). 
 203. See generally West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 33. 
 204. Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 188, at 1231. 
 However, the company president has a lot of 
influence over who will be selected to serve as directors. The president 
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chooses the nominees, who are confirmed by the shareholders during the 
annual meeting.205 Directors are mostly representative directors206
Before the bubble burst
 who act 
for their respective stakeholder groups. 
207 and almost ten years thereafter, it was not 
particularly difficult to become a director in a Japanese entity, markedly 
because of the large size of the board and the fact that most board members 
were insiders.208 Inside directors were essentially middle-level employees 
who rose up the ranks and were awarded the distinction of serving the board 
of directors because of the strength of their loyalty and commitment to the 
company. 209 The directorship was dangled as the “ultimate prize of the 
permanent employment system.”210 These directors were regarded as the 
ultimate leaders of all of the employees, particularly since they still retained 
their managerial and operational responsibilities. 211
Outside directors may either be grey directors or independent ones. 
Independent outside directors (dokuritsu shagai torishimariyaku) are those 
who have absolutely no ties with management, have never been employees, 
suppliers, or creditors of the company, and are truly independent in 
perspective. The Japanese Commercial Code does not require the presence 
of independent directors.
 These employee-
insiders were handpicked by management and confirmed during the 
shareholders meeting. 
212 Grey outside directors, on the other hand, are 
never truly independent and hardly possess an outsider’s point of view. 
Many are current government officials from ministries or agencies that have 
strong links with the company such as the Ministry of Finance. They are 
deployed to the board of directors in their twilight years213
                                                                                                                 
 205. MAKOTO OHTSU & TOMIO IMANARI, INSIDE JAPANESE BUSINESS: A NARRATIVE 
HISTORY, 1960-2000, at 359 (2002). See also Senechal, supra note 32, at 541–42 (One problem in 
corporate Japan is that there are “too-powerful chief executives . . . [and] a corporate governance 
system that provides few controls on executive action and little emphasis on shareholders.”). 
 206. Senechal, supra note 32, at 542–43. 
 207. See ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 191 (“Businesses indulged in over-investment, hired 
too many employees and borrowed too heavily. Banks lent too freely to over-leveraged customers 
and acquired large amounts of loans that could not be repaid, especially after the collapse of a land 
and shares asset price bubble in the early 1990s. The financial authorities were complicit in 
allowing banks to cover up their non-performing loans, which were eroding bank capital.”). 
 208. Senechal, supra note 32, at 536. 
 209. Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 188, at 1234. 
 210. See Ahmadjian & Okumura, supra note 16, at 132. 
 211. See Yasui, supra note 47, at 123.  
 212. In 2005, a complete revision of Japanese Commercial Code took place and the Diet 
ushered in the new Company Act that went into effect on May 1, 2006. This new law requires the 
presence of independent directors only if the company chooses the Committee System over the 
Statutory Auditor system. Companies Act, Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 47, translated in CABINET 
SECRETARIAT, available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/CA1_4_2.pdf. 
 213. See ALEXANDER, supra note 107, at 99–100. 
 not just to serve 
as conduit officers, but similarly to reward them for their good government 
service. These directors are known as amakudari, literally meaning “sent 
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down from heaven,” and strengthen government-business relations. They 
are also sent to supplement their meager government income with the 
higher salaries provided by the private sector.214 Grey outside directors are 
also comprised of retired government ministry officials, likewise part of the 
amakudari, who are deployed to guarantee the good performance of the 
company—a way for the government to look out for the interests of the 
private sector.215
Despite impressions to the contrary, Main Bank board directors are 
generally found to be inordinately successful in their monitoring functions 
(or at least they were before the bubble burst), as they capably oversee the 
activities and decisions of the board and its corporate officers.
 Grey outside directors may likewise be bank executives, 
or the officers of customers or parent companies. Their primary role is to 
make sure that the good, harmonious relationship between the company and 
their original employers is maintained; or if they are from the Main Bank, 
to act as overseers during any corporate reorganization. 
216 They are 
able to intervene when necessary, remove underperforming CEOs,217 and 
provide much needed liquidity to the company.218
VII. BOARD REFORMS, JAPANESE-STYLE 
 
Japan reacted swiftly and drastically to the market conditions resulting 
from the bubble burst and the economic stagnation of the 1990s. In 
response to the introduction of legislative reform, the boards of directors, 
once described as merely ceremonial and comprised of the elders of the 
corporate community, 219  responded affirmatively. Many companies 
downsized their board of directors for efficiency and some included 
independent outside directors for objectivity.220
                                                                                                                 
 214. See Ahmadjian & Okumura, supra note 16, at 132. 
 215. Kenji Suzuki, The Changing Pattern of Amakudari Appointments – The Case of Regional 
Banks 1991-2000 8 (Working Paper No. 187, Jan. 2004), available at 
http://swopec.hhs.se/eijswp/papers/eijswp0187.pdf. 
 216. YUWA WEI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 151–152 (2003). 
 217. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as 
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1300 (1991). 
 218. See generally Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and 
Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 401 (2002). 
 219. SIMON LEARMOUNT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM JAPAN? 
125–143 (2002). Many directors view board meetings as simply ceremonial since decisions are 
really made by the senior executive committee or jomu-kai of the board, while the plenary board 
just rubber-stamps and ratifies them. 
 220. However, some Japanese companies resorted to merely renaming their structures without a 
substantial change in functions, attitude and outlook. Since their boards were composed of the 
elitist senior management committee (with the company president) and a larger plenary group 
inclusive of junior board members who were concurrent executive officers, they simply renamed 
the former as the “board” (hence making it a 10-man member) while denominating the junior 
members as “executive officers.” See Araki, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 190, at 74–78. 
 More importantly, by the 
end of the 1990s, the Japanese business monoliths were reduced to a game 
of survival of the fittest. Because the Main Banks were no longer 
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functioning at their previous levels, companies were continuously looking 
for external financing via the capital markets. 221  Consequently, the 
economic pendulum swung from crisis to promise of recovery to crisis once 
again. There was also a clear corporate governance vacuum as the 
government did not know how to respond to the burgeoning equity 
dominance of U.S and U.K. shareholders. 222
The series of reforms undertaken by the Japanese government in the 
1990s, known as the “financial Big Bang,”
 The Japanese government 
knew that reform was necessary despite howling protests and resistance 
from hardliners in the corporate boardrooms. 
223 stressed deregulation.224 It 
included limiting the board presence of retired government officials 
“descen[d] from heaven” or amakudari by withholding National Personnel 
Authority waivers.225 The amakudari were viewed as inefficient by foreign 
shareholders, and in 2007, a law was passed aimed specifically at reducing 
the amakudari problem. 226 In 1997, stock options were allowed, and in 
December 2001, directors’ personal liability was limited.227 In 2002, the 
government introduced the alien concept of independent directors when it 
amended the Commercial Code.228 The definition, however, of independent 
outside directors was so weak 229
                                                                                                                 
 221. Trends in Japan, Banging on Japan’s Door: Big Bang Reforms Attract Overseas Banks, 
Sep. 9, 1997, http://web-japan.org/trends98/honbun/ntj970909.html.  
 222. See Nottage, supra note 11, at 269. 
 223. Shinji Fukukawa, Development of the Japanese Big Bang and its Impact, Nov. 11, 1997, 
http://brie.berkeley.edu/research/forum/fukukawa.html. 
 224. Edward J. Lincoln & Robert E. Litan, The “Big Bang”? An Ambivalent Japan Deregulates 
Its Financial Markets, BROOKINGS (1998), available at  
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1998/winter_globaleconomics _lincoln.aspx?rssid=japan. 
 225. RICHARD A. COLIGNON & CHIKAKO USUI, AMAKUDARI: THE HIDDEN FABRIC OF JAPAN’S 
ECONOMY 23 (2003). 
 226. The Diet approved on June 30, 2007 a bill revising the National Public Service Law 
specifically on the regulation of future employment of retiring national public servants called 
“Amakudari.” See Hiroko Nakata, Cabinet OKs ‘Amakudari’ Bill, Bureaucrat Reform, Apr. 25, 
2007, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20070425f2.html. See also Hiroko Nakata, ‘Amakudari’ Too Entrenched to Curb?, May 29, 
2007, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20070529i1.html. 
 227. Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Shareholder Suits and Outside 
Director Liability: The Case of Korea 17–18 (European Corporate Governance Institute Law 
Working Paper N 47/2005; University of Texas Law School Law and Economics Research Paper 
No. 35; and Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper 
No. 298; 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=628223. See also Australian 
Institute of Company Directors, Risky Business Directors and Lawsuits, Feb. 2005, 
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Media/Company+Director/2005/February/Risky+business+
directors+and+lawsuits+Cover+Story.htm (citing and analyzing the above article written by 
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins, & Michael Klausner); Barry Metzger, Kym Bavcevich & 
Shintaro Kuroda, Japan: Overview of Recent Corporate Governance Reforms, 
http://www.globalcorporategovernance.com/n_ap/283_291.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). 
 228. Shoho to no ichibu wo kaisei suru horitsu [Act Partially Amending the Commercial Code], 
(Law No. 44, 2002). 
 that it permitted the appointment of 
 229. Individuals who have never previously been an executive director, are not currently 
employed by the company, and have never been employed by the company or any of its 
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“family members, golf buddies, or old dormitory roommates as outside 
directors to ensure entrenchment of the incumbent management.”230 Even 
the amakudari could be legally appointed. In particular, the 2002 law 
allowed the companies to choose between: (1) the U.S.-style board which 
has three committees, nominating, audit and remuneration, that are to be 
composed primarily by independent directors (the Company with 
Committees system (iinkai setchi gaisha)); or the (2) traditional statutory 
auditor system (kensayaku) by which no independent directors were 
required to be appointed.231
Before the onslaught of U.S.-style reforms such as the Company with 
Committees system, the Japanese Commercial Code required firms to have 
statutory auditors
 
232 (theoretically elected directly by shareholders) whose 
function was to audit the board and to ensure accuracy of financial 
reports. 233 The auditors would sometimes sit in board meetings as non-
voting members. These statutory auditors, though mandated by law to be 
chosen by the shareholders and nominally empowered with vast oversight 
authority,234 served in fact at the pleasure of the company president. They 
were typically not independent 235  since the post could be occupied by 
former employees who had not worked for the firm in the last five years.236 
There were no special qualifications to become a statutory auditor. Due to 
their weak and often conflicted status,237 statutory auditors did not play the 
role of independent directors238
                                                                                                                 
subsidiaries Kaisha Ho [Company Law], (Law No. 86, Art. 2, Par. 15, 2005). The same broad, 
weak definition of outside directors was found in Article 188 of the Commercial Code. See Shōhō 
[COMMERCIAL CODE], Art. 188(2)(7.2) (2002) (Japan). 
 230. See Tomotaka Fujita, Modernising Japanese Corporate Law: Ongoing Corporate Law 
Reform in Japan, 16 SING. ACAD. L.J. 321, 340 (2004). 
 231. See generally Toda & McCarty, supra note 22. 
 232. Statutory Auditors have been in existence since the Commercial Code’s enactment in 
1899. However, the position is essentially functionally weaker if compared to the supervisory 
board of German corporate governance. In 1993, as part of the reforms as a result of the bubble 
burst, the government introduced the board of statutory auditors (for companies with paid-up 
capital exceeding 500 million yen or with total liabilities in excess of 20 billion yen) composed of 
at least 3 auditors, with one full time and one “independent.” See LAWS & REGULATIONS ON 
SETTING UP BUSINESS IN JAPAN, JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG. 6 (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/pdf/2008setting_e.pdf  
 233. Lawley, supra note 202, at 109. 
 234. Statutory auditors can demand reports from employees and the board of directors, attend 
but not vote in board meetings, seek the re-study or suspension of a director’s actions or program 
if deemed not in the best interest of the company, and examine the financial condition of the firm. 
They cannot appoint or seek the removal of directors, and do not necessarily represent shareholder 
or employee interests. See generally LAWS & REGULATIONS ON SETTING UP BUSINESS IN JAPAN, 
supra note 232. 
 235. See LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 131–33. 
 236. See Toda & McCarty, supra note 22, at 204. 
 237. Other than being former employees, statutory auditors may also be employees of business 
partners, group companies, the Main Bank or other large shareholders. 
 238. Senechal, supra note 32, at 543–44. 
 as would be expected of members of an 
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audit committee in a U.S. corporate board setting. Below is a flowchart of 
the traditional statutory auditor system: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result of the 2002 amendment, companies such as AEON, a 
leading supermarket chain that boasts of large retail areas in major cities, 
can choose to institute the U.S.-inspired committee system. 239  Once a 
company opts for the committee system by amending the certificate of 
incorporation, it is required to appoint three members for each of the 
committees, a majority of whom should be independent outside directors.240 
The same independent outside director may sit in all three committees.241
                                                                                                                 
 239. See generally id. 
 240. The 2002 amendment to the Commercial Code paved the way for a choice between the 
statutory auditor model and the U.S.-style committee system. This was reinforced in 2005 with the 
passage of Kaisha Ho [Company Law], Law No. 86, Article 400, in 2005. Gilson and Mihaupt 
described this choice as regulatory reform, made in an unusual fashion, and was an enabling 
strategy of reform. It allowed companies to choose what they felt was best for them. This enabling 
system mirrors the U.S. corporate governance model where traditionally everything is available 
and nothing is required. This has been changing, however, with strict NYSE and SEC 
requirements. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 344. With the 2002 reform, the Company 
with Committee system (Company with Three Committee System or iinkai setchi gaisha) is 
available only for large companies, specifically those with capitalization was more than 500 
million yen or whose total debt on a balance sheet was more than 20 billion yen. With the 2005 
overhaul (the new Company Act), however, the committee system has been opened to all 
companies, regardless of capital or debt. If companies chose the Company with Committee 
structure, they will have to amend their articles of incorporation or memorandum of association. 
 241. See Senechal, supra note 32, at 551–53. 
 
This means that the minimum requirement for a committee system 
corporation is two independent directors who can concurrently sit in all 
three committees. If the company wishes to remain steadfastly traditional, 
Source: Mitsuru Tanaka (Jones Day 
Showa/Tokyo), Japanese Corporate 
Governance, International Financial 
Law Review Corporate Governance 
2003 Supplement, http://www.iflr.com/ 
Article/2026792/Japan.html (last visited 
on Apr. 14, 2009). 
 
The representative directors do not com-
prise a separate body despite being in a 
separate box. They form a big part of the 
board and have executive powers in the 
company.  They represent the various 
stakeholders, especially the employees. 
 
Key features: Statutory auditors are (a) 
usually dominated and beholden to the 
company president; (b) appointed by the 
president; (c) not independent generally; 
(d) may be conflicted; and (e) have vast 
powers theoretically. 
2009] Board Reforms with a Japanese Twist 357 
as most have, it can opt for the statutory auditor system and still not be 
required to appoint independent directors.242 This was further clarified in 
the 2005 Company Act, 243  the law that completely overhauled the 
Commercial Code. Below is a flowchart of the Company with Committees 
model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 242. See id. at 536. 
 243. Kaisha Ho [Company Law], Law No. 86 (2005). 
Source: Mitsuru Tanaka (Jones Day Showa/Tokyo), Japanese Corporate Governance, Internation-
al Financial Law Review Corporate Governance 2003 Supplement, 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/2026792/Japan.html (last visited on Apr. 14, 2009). 
  
According to Tanaka, the "Shikko-yaku" (corporate executive officer) is “entitled to make decisions 
regarding business operations (as) entrusted by the board of directors and operate the business of 
the company . . . although the board of directors retains the authority to determine the business 
operations of the company, most of its decision-making function can be transferred to the Shikko-
yaku except for certain specified items.” 
 
The Shikko-yaku is like the U.S. CEO, except that his powers and authority are wholly dependent 
on the board.  Since 2003, Sony has adopted the Company with Committees model together with 
the Shikko-yaku system, thus separating the functions of monitoring and management. 
 
Key features: (a) incorporates a U.S.-style committee system; (b) the majority of committee mem-
bers must be “independent”; (c) a diluted definition of “independent” outside directors; and (d) is 
not preferred by most Japanese corporations. 
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Largely ceremonial, rubber-stamping 
body which may have the 3 U.S.-style 
committees with at least 2 “outside” 
directors each. 
Whether a firm chooses the Company with Committees system or the 
statutory auditor model, the following diagram illustrates the general 
composition of the board of directors: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The choice to have either the committee system or the statutory auditor 
system was a compromise between the Ministry of Justice and the business 
sector; with the business oligarchs not wanting to be compelled to appoint 
independent directors.244 The 2002 reform and 2005 overhaul were intended 
to increase the oversight function of the board and to further segregate 
decision-making from supervisory functions within a company.245 But since 
the 2005 Company Act also provided for directors simultaneously serving 
as executive officers or employees of the corporation,246
As expected, the old oligarchs at the helm of the great Japanese 
companies prevailed not only in giving the companies the right to choose 
which system was good for them, but also to convince their respective 
companies that the conventional statutory auditor approach was already 
satisfactory. As a result, most companies chose the statutory auditor system. 
By the end of 2004, only about sixty firms chose the committee system with 
independent directors.
 an idiosyncratic 
feature of Japanese corporate culture, the attainment of these goals was 
limited. 
247
                                                                                                                 
 244. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 353–54. The Ministry of Justice was the 
proponent of the abolition of the Statutory Auditor system and its replacement by the U.S.-style 
board of committees. Id. 
 245. Toda & McCarty, supra note 22, at 205. 
 246. Kaisha Ho [Company Law], Art. 402, Par. 6. 
 Tradition was preferred over efficiency, proving 
 247. By the end of March 2004, the number of companies that switched to the committee 
system was 37 firms. If Hitachi Ltd.’s and Nomura Holding’s subsidiaries were added, this would 
result to 71 firms in total, with 45 publicly listed companies. This increased to about 60 (from 37) 
by the end of 2004. Two years after, the number did not change much. As of late 2006, a total of 
76 corporations (from 60) had chosen the committee system. If Hitachi Ltd.’s and Nomura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japanese Board of Directors 
Senior Executive Committee 
or Jomu-kai composed of the 
president and senior board 
members 
Junior Board Members 
(representing departments) 
Elite senior group comprising about 9-
10 persons who make the real decisions 
(an informal management committee 
according to Gilson & Milhaupt). See 
Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 
343, 349. 
Beholden junior directors who await 
Jomu-kai instructions (around 20–30 
people). 
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that the statutory flexibility by which boards can choose their governance 
and monitoring systems did not work well in Japan. However, it must be 
remembered that this is Japan, still a highly conservative society where 
changes take time. 
From the U.S. perspective, the fact that Japanese moguls and business 
leaders successfully pushed for a choice of the board system and persuaded 
their companies to adhere to the old statutory auditor form may be seen as 
unfortunate signs of a static, broken system. But Japan has its own time for 
change, unperturbed by how fast the West changes and adapts to its 
environs. Even without the U.S.-style committees, Japanese companies 
have fared well vis-à-vis North American companies. J-Form/statutory 
auditor companies like Toyota have outsold American car manufacturers 
since late 2007.248 Toyota once dominated the cheaper car market in the 
1970s and 1980s, then outperformed classic American car companies for 
the higher-end market with the Camry model and Lexus line in the 1990s, 
and is now again penetrating the lower-end market again with the Echo 
(now Yaris). 249 Toyota also fiercely competes in the gas-electric hybrid 
market with its Prius.250
The main contention of the old guards is that corporate Japan does not 
need independent directors the way American corporations need them.
 Corporate cultural differences aside, nothing can be 
taken away from these great Japanese companies. These incremental, inch-
by-inch changes are just the way the Japanese have done things for 
centuries and will continue to in this new millennium. 
251
                                                                                                                 
Holding’s affiliates and subsidiaries are included, the total is 110. In 2004, there were almost 
700,000 stock companies in Japan. Of this number, as of 2006, there were 2,323 that were listed 
with the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Hence, the number of adopting companies is staggeringly low: 
from 2004 to 2006, only 16 firms were added to the list. The initial excitement immediately wore 
off. However, some of the companies that adopted the committee system were the large ones such 
as Sony, Toshiba, Konica Minolta, Orix, Columbia Music Entertainment, Mitsubishi Electric, 
Seiyu (a large retail entity controlled by Wal-Mart), Tokyo Star Bank (acquired by Lone Star), 
Shinsei Bank, Fidelity Securities and the JASDAQ Securities Exchange. There were two basic 
reasons given for why they adopted the committee system: (a) they had large foreign shareholders; 
and (b) they were listed in foreign stock exchanges. It may encourage foreign shareholders or 
Westerners in general to know that the board is transparent, performs monitoring functions and 
adheres to “global best practices.” Other reasons given were that they were global market players 
or had strategic motivations. Gilson and Milhaupt asserted that these firms adopted the new 
system because they were independent from the traditional patterns of Japanese corporate 
behavior as they were either mavericks, new start-ups, had no Main Bank, or were concentrated in 
such industries as electronics, finance and retail. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 356. 
 248. Nick Bunkley, G.M. Says Toyota Has Lead in Global Sales Race, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/24/business/worldbusiness/24auto.html?. 
 249. Elizabeth Johnson, Toyota Yaris, Conceptcarz.com, http://www.conceptcarz.com/vehicle/ 
z6942/Toyota-Yaris.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
 250. New Car Test Drive, Toyota Prius: Introduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, available at 
http://autos.nytimes.com/2008/Toyota/Prius/286/3326/293013/NCTD/researchReviews.aspx. 
 
 251. Barney Jopson & David Pilling, U.S. Corporate Governance not Suited to Japan, Says 
Ministry, FIN. TIMES, June 21, 2003. See also Toda & McCarty, supra note 22, at 225–26 
(discussing how “[t]here is a great deal of opposition to the introduction of outside directors. 
Criticism to this system amounts to the question: ‘What do those from the outside know about our 
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Certainly, there was the bubble burst and the economic stagnation of the 
1990s, but there is no one person or single corporate entity that can be 
identified as the cause. For many of the old guards, the independent director 
is a liberal American concept that will not work well in insular Japan. 
Independent directors are bereft of any understanding or expertise of how 
the company works and thus cannot properly supervise it.252 The antipathy 
regarding the presence of independent directors is widespread and the 
reforms which began in 2002 are moving at snail’s pace. To select an 
independent director is to distrust management and the board, and it 
constrains the notion of a company family or community.253 The concept of 
independent directors does not sit well with these corporate old guards since 
they generally trust directors and managers.254 Some are also of the view 
that board meetings, in contrast to the U.S. perspective that it is a critical 
platform for corporate governance, are a mere “formality . . . just a 
festivity,”255 and utilized only for information dissemination256
However, one thing these old guards cannot claim is that the scandals 
that hit the U.S. in 2001–2002 never had a Japanese counterpart. Corporate 
 in Japan—
thus, nothing drastic is needed. At best, a choice between the old and new 
systems should be provided. 
                                                                                                                 
company?’ The main concern is that such board members would not be capable of properly 
judging the company’s business practices to make an appropriate decision. . . . One of the 
companies that made no changes is Canon Inc. Its President, Mr. Mitarai, strongly defends the 
current corporate governance structure. He argues that the existing corporate system under 
supervision of its auditors works just fine for Canon. At many U.S. companies what outside 
directors actually do is just listen to corporate executives’ explanations about companies, rather 
than performing their supposed role of supervising management. This is because they have little 
knowledge about day-to-day operations of companies due to part-time status.”). Mr. Mitarai’s 
comments were originally derived from U.S.-Style Corporate Governance?, NIKKEI WEEKLY, 
June 30, 2003, at 9. 
 252. Mark Poe, Kay Shimizu & Jeannie Simpson, Revising the Japanese Commercial Code: A 
Summary and Evaluation of the Reform Effort, 2 STAN. J. EAST ASIAN AFF. 71, 74 (2002). 
Additionally, Gilson and Milhaupt opined that independent directors are not “well suited to 
perform a useful role in highly relational Japanese corporate affairs” and that even finding 
independent directors suited to the task is daunting. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 354. 
 253. See Alison Tudor, Proxy Adviser Targets Japan Inc.: Investors Are Urged to Reject Chief 
Executives, Support Independent Directors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009, at C2. See also Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, Speech & Q&A on his article entitled Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of 
Japanese Corporate Governance (May 12, 2004) (transcript available at 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/04051201.html) [hereinafter Milhaupt, Speech]. 
 254. This belief cannot be compared to E. Merrick Dodd’s notion that managers should have 
primacy—thus placing extreme trust on directors and officers. This is because, considering the 
essential features of the Japanese corporate model, even if they trusted their managers (and not the 
shareholders), they still heavily relied upon the monitoring of large stakeholders and even by the 
state through the Ministry of Finance’s deployed officials as board members. Dodd did not adhere 
to government regulation; corporatist Adolf A. Berle did, as he believed that managers cannot be 
fully trusted and must be subject to strict regulation. See generally E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom 
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 255. See LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 126. 
 256. See id. 
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governance scandals in Japan are aplenty. 257  These scandals may not 
compare in magnitude to Enron or Worldcom (which ushered in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act), but they have caused grave dishonor to Japanese 
companies. Daiwa Bank, due to rogue trader Toshihide Iguchi, lost $1.1 
billion on illegal bond trading from 1984 to 1995. 258  Since the 1980s, 
Tokyo Electric Power filed at least 29 falsified reports to nuclear-safety 
regulators, with these reports failing to include safety problems at eight 
nuclear reactors. 259 The Sokaiya have also been responsible for bringing 
negative press to Japanese companies by physically harassing directors 
during shareholder meetings, exerting extortionist influence, and allegedly 
masterminding the killing of corporate leaders. 260  In July 2000, Snow 
Brand’s milk caused 14,000 people to get sick after drinking its bacteria-
contaminated product. 261  In September 2000, Mitsubishi admitted it 
covered up vehicle defects, which resulted in the belated recall of 
approximately 600,000 to 800,000 cars and trucks that led to deaths, fires, 
accidents and injuries since the 1980s.262 Some of these scandals came to 
light because of the efforts of whistleblowers, leading to the Whistleblowers 
Protection Law, passed in 2004.263
The Japanese corporate scandals over the last ten years too represent a 
kind of perversion of the stakeholder model, where management, in the 
name of protecting employees and other stakeholders, diverted corporate 
assets to pet projects, hid losses in subsidiaries and destroyed corporate 
value. . . . [T]he Japanese systems of corporate governance converged into 
a kind of managerial capitalism—or capitalism for the benefit of those 
who control the corporation.
 In response to these big scandals, Arthur 
M. Mitchell, Asian Development Bank’s General Counsel, stated in 2002 
that: 
264
                                                                                                                 
 257. See Ahmadjian & Okumura, supra note 16, at 142 (discussing “[s]ubstantial losses at 
Sumitomo Corporation and Daiwa Bank due to rogue traders, cover-ups of defects by Mitsubishi 
Motors, sales of spoiled milk by Snow Brand, and inadequate maintenance and monitoring of 
nuclear power plants by Tokyo Electric Power.”).  See also Ruback, supra note 63 at 185, 207. 
 258. Yamada, supra note 184, at 211. 
 259. Japanese Corporate Scandals: A Critical Mass of Disgust?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 
2002, available at http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id= 
E1_TPTRDVG. 
 260. See Mark D. West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the United States: 
Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767–68 (1999). 
 261. Unfortunately, the head of the factory was merely fined $1,000 and received a two-year 
suspended sentence, while the company was fined $4,500 by the Osaka District Court. Anthony 
Faiola, New Cover-Up Allegations Hobble Japan’s Fourth-Largest Automaker, WASHINGTON 
POST, July 6, 2004, at E01. 
 262. Id. (“Mitsubishi officials concede that a culture of cover-up existed at the company.”).  
 263. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 2004, Act No. 122 (2006), available at 
http://www.asianlii.org/jp/legis/laws/wpa2004an122o2004371/. 
 264. Arthur M. Mitchell, What is the Right Model for Corporate Governance in Developing 
Asia?, Asian Institute of Management Annual Conference of CEOs, COOs and Directors in Asia 
(Manila, June 5–6, 2003), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Speeches/2003/sp2003024.asp. 
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The flexibility of choosing between the Japanese statutory auditor 
system and the U.S. committee model has been met with open arms by 
many Japanese corporate giants that benefit from such flexibility. This 
flexible, enabling approach allows them to advertise to the world that, in 
law, they have followed the U.S. committee model, but in practice have 
chosen the old statutory auditor system by a great majority. This also gives 
them the ability to avoid Enron/Worldcom-like scandals. As aptly put by 
the Chairman of Fuji Xerox, Yotaro Kobayashi: 
The board structure is being changed in a number of Japanese companies, 
some are reducing the board size and inviting outside board members. The 
direction is right, but I’m not really sure that many of those outside 
independent directors are given the freedom that many of the independent 
directors have on the boards of [U.S.] corporations. Still, I remain positive 
about the outlook. One thing which is unique in Japan is that we have the 
company position of statutory auditor; and that’s part of the law. There’s 
an argument, a debate as to whether a truly effective audit can be done 
either by the statutory auditors or by an audit committee made up by 
independent directors, the [U.S.] way. My feeling is that we can probably 
combine the two. We will live with the statutory audit system as it is part 
of our commercial code, but also we will invite outside board members to 
the board so that the board, and, of course, most importantly, the 
management can really benefit from the different views. And, if we can 
actually combine, that might produce some interesting structure for the 
Japanese version of corporate governance.265
Yet those who clamor for more changes and reforms, such as more 
independent directors and increased shareholder returns, have been 
chastised as corporate radicals, boardroom bullies, company raiders, 
unnecessary “shareholder champion(s),”
 
266 “financial insurgent(s),”267 and 
“unscrupulous asset stripper(s).”268 There has been widespread antagonism 
toward reformers fueled by negative media coverage and government 
prosecution, implying that reformers were Japanese by blood but not by 
character. 269
                                                                                                                 
 265. Yotaro Kobayashi, Japan’s Changing Corporate Structure, 2000 
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/null/Op45?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=592779&showth
umb=0. 
 266. Kenji Hall, An Activist’s Fall From Grace, BUS. WK., June 5, 2006 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2006/gb20060605_562253.htm?campaign_id
=rss_topStories/. 
 267. Yoshiaki Murakami, BUS. WK., July 8, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/ 
magazine/content/02_27/b3790623.htm. 
 268. Id. 
 
 269. In 2005, Livedoor’s CEO Takafumi Horie was championed by some as the first Japanese 
homegrown shareholder activist. Although his actions were not traditionally Japanese, he 
espoused the enhancement of shareholder value. He was, however, arrested and indicted in 
January 2006 on allegations of accounting fraud and stock market manipulation. In March 2007, 
the Tokyo District Court sentenced him to two and a half years imprisonment. Hisane Masaki, The 
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Despite the weak definition of independent directors and the fact that 
most firms choose tradition over reform, not all firms have rejected reform. 
Some firms, particularly those with strong foreign shareholdings, have 
introduced independent directors.270 Firms that chose the statutory auditor 
system have made moves to make them more independent and not beholden 
to the company president or chief executive.271 For example, Sony reduced 
its top-heavy board by decreasing directors from thirty-eight to just ten in 
1997, long before the 2002 amendment. 272  The twenty-eight former 
directors were not terminated by the company but were transformed into 
“executive officers,” a unique Sony creation in 1997.273 They were formerly 
the directors in charge of managing subsidiaries. By 2003, Sony chose the 
committee system with a corporate executive officer system or Shikko-yaku, 
further establishing itself as the leading Japanese institution closely 
following the U.S. corporate governance model.274 As of May 2001, 38% of 
first-section firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange added outside 
directors to their boards.275 By 2002, about one-third of listed companies 
adopted a reduction in board membership, 80% of which “scaled back to 
fewer than ten directors.”276
                                                                                                                 
Fall of a Japanese Business Iconoclast, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IC17Dh01.html. Another homegrown activist, Yoshiaki 
Murakami, CEO of Murakami Fund, a highly confrontational investment fund, was making 
headlines for attempting to take over large, well-established corporations. In June 2006, Murakami 
was arrested on allegations of a series of insider trading scandals. In July 2007, just a few months 
after Horie’s sentencing, the Tokyo District Court fined Murakami 3 million yen, sentenced him 
to two years of incarceration, and additionally seized 1.15 billion yen. See Japan Fund Manager 
Found Guilty, BBC NEWS, July 19, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/business/6905780.stm; but see Livedoor Manager Spared Jail, STRAITS TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 3, 
2009, http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_333744.html 
(discussing the Tokyo High Court’s decision to suspend Murakami’s two-year prison sentence 
while upholding  the 1.15 billion yen fine). 
 270. Some reputable large companies such as Hoya Corp., Square Co., Densei-Lambda KK and 
Seiyo Food Systems Inc. have boards comprised of more than one half of outsiders; Kinki Nippon 
Railway Co., SSP Co. and five other companies have appointed more than five outside directors. 
See Poe, Shimizu & Simpson, supra note 252, at 84. 
 271. Japan Corporate Auditors Association, The Corporate Auditor System in Japan, Mar. 11, 
2007, http://www.kansa.or.jp/english/about_02.html. See also Metzger et al., supra note 227.    
 272. See Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction, supra note 90, at 2117. 
 273. See id. 
 274. See Senechal, supra note 32, at 554–55. 
 275. See MILHAUPT & WEST, supra note 102, at 195. 
 276. Id. 
 Though reduction in board size and an increase 
in the number of outside directors were the favored governance reforms, 
there was no corollary shift to the committee system. Corporate boards, 
now reduced and with fewer outsiders, were still dominated by company 
insiders. 
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VIII. INSIDE, INDEPENDENT AND GREY DIRECTORS 
Despite the evolution of Japanese corporate boards and increasing 
application of Delaware-style governance structures, grey directors are still 
prevalent in Japan. As mentioned previously, Japanese corporate boards are 
composed of inside, independent and grey directors, differing significantly 
from U.S. practice. An inside director is an employee or officer of the 
company, or an officer of an affiliate company or subsidiary.277 In contrast, 
an independent director is someone who is not an inside director and who, 
at least conceptually, enforces the regulations set by government, monitors 
compliance of the company, and sets clear goals for the company. 278 
Independent directors provide the functions of highly staffed regulatory 
agencies, but they are cheaper and have less agency costs.279
The Japanese practice regarding independent directors (or the option to 
introduce independent directors into the board) can be sharply juxtaposed 
with the ideal corporate board described by Martin Lipton and Jay Lorsch 
in 1992.
 Independent 
directors do not have a real stake in the company, and if the situation calls 
for it, perform a monitoring role and criticize the performance of the CEO, 
the management or the entire board. They are the monitors and watchdogs 
of the board and the agents of stewardship. Their presence is needed in all 
of the committees and their approval or confirmation may cleanse an 
otherwise self-dealing transaction. 
280 According to Lipton and Lorsch, the maximum board should be 
ten members, but the ideal is eight or nine members, with the CEO as the 
only insider on the board. 281  Though many Japanese companies have 
reduced their overpopulated boards to around ten directors, most of them 
are still comprised of insiders.282 Lipton and Lorsch also proposed that the 
ideal board should have term limits and that the maximum number of 
boards that directors can serve on is three (to ensure valuable 
performance).283 As of now, there are no term limits284
                                                                                                                 
 277. See generally Cheryl L. Wade, What Independent Directors Should Expect from Inside 
Directors: Smith v. Van Gorkom as a Guide to Intra-Firm Governance, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 367 
(2006). 
 278. See generally Victor Brudney, The Independent Director – Heavenly City or Potemkin 
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982). 
 279. Gordon, supra note 189, at 1476 (“Large public firms have moved to a pattern of one, 
perhaps two, inside directors and an increasing number of independent directors. Some academics 
and practitioners have characterized the emerging pattern as the cynosure of corporate governance 
because of its maximum control of managerial agency costs.”). 
 280. See generally Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179. 
 281. Id. at 67. For the National Association of Corporate Directors, the ideal board size is 
between eight to eleven directors. See Roger Raber, Corporate Governance in the Global 
Economy: Roles and Responsibilities of Corporate Directors, RIETI, July 26, 2006, 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/06072601.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). 
 282. RALF BEBENROTH & LI DONGHAO, PERFORMANCE IMPACT AT THE BOARD LEVEL: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 24 (Nov. 2006), http://www.bebenroth.eu/Downloads/ 
BoardroomBebenrothLi.pdf. 
 283. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 69. 
 nor is there a ceiling 
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on the number of boards that directors can serve on in Japan. Lipton and 
Lorsch similarly advocated for a Lead (Independent) Director who would 
counterbalance the power and authority of the CEO.285 Japanese companies 
have been unable to install true independent directors on their boards286 and 
thus obtaining a majority of independent directors or a lead independent 
director is unlikely. However, Lipton and Lorsch’s idea of three important 
board committees (Audit, Nominating, Compensation)287
[M]ost directors of Japanese companies are also officers of the same 
company, which is quite different from American and British companies. 
Independent, non-executive directors are uncommon, although Japanese 
company auditors could be seen as a type of non-executive director. 
Nearly a half of listed companies adopt outside directors, but most of them 
still come from another company in the same corporate group. Such 
outside directors are not considered independent enough from the 
executives of the company to make fair judgment when a control contest 
occurs.
 is already a reality 
in Japan; the problem is that it is merely a choice between the U.S.-style 
committee system or the old, static statutory auditor system. As stated by 
Japanese Professor Kenichi Osugi: 
288
Lipton and Lorsch likewise envisioned that there ought to be a 
minimum time commitment for board members.
 
289
                                                                                                                 
 284. Only the length of each term is specified but not the number of times a director can be 
reelected. Kaisha Ho [Company Act], Act No. 86 of 2005, article 332 (Directors’ Terms of 
Office). 
 285. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 70–71. 
 286. ULRIKE SCHAEDE & WILLIAM W. GRIMES, JAPAN’S MANAGED GLOBALIZATION: 
ADAPTING TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 216 (2003). 
 287. See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 68–69. 
 288. See Osugi, supra note 173, at 154. See also Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 349 
(stating “it is safe to assume that a significant percentage of these new outside directors are not 
truly independent of the firms on whose boards they serve.”). 
 They argued that there 
 289. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 64–65. In 2006, fourteen years after publication, 
Martin Lipton complained, inter alia, in a memorandum written on November 1, 2006, (1) the 
three committees were turning into individualized fiefdoms; (2) the CEO was excluded from 
committee meetings; (3) public pension funds demanded meetings with independent directors; (4) 
the definition of “independence” was narrowing; (5) time demands on directors were increasing; 
(6) CEO or business people were limited to just one outside board, if any; (7) extensive 
questionnaires were needed to determine potential conflict of interests or independence; (8) the 
number of outside advisors was increasing; and (9) special investigation committees composed of 
independent directors were proliferating. These recent complaints, though rational and relevant, 
seem to be at odds with his and Lorsch’s proposals back in 1992. Were they not the ones who 
proposed most of them? Back in 1992, they advocated for (a) the formation of these three 
committees with independent directors; (b) the non-interference of the CEO to preserve 
independence; (c) the necessity for directors and officers to “meet annually in an informal setting 
with five to ten of the larger investors in the company . . . to promote understanding between the 
two groups and provide a convenient and informal opportunity for the investors to tell the 
directors . . . any concerns the investors have” otherwise known as the “annual meeting with large 
investors” proposal; (d) the importance of director independence; (e) the need for more director 
time spent on corporate affairs; (f) limitation to just three outside boards for proper focus and due 
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should be at least eight to twelve board meetings a year, and the board 
should regularly and formally break into committees entirely composed of 
independent directors, have comprehensive full-board sessions, and at least 
one day of preparation before each board or committee session.290 There 
should also be annual three-day strategy meetings.291 In all, directors should 
spend at least 100 meaningful hours per year for board service. 292  In 
contrast, research shows that Japanese plenary boards infrequently meet.293 
The Company Act of 2005 requires that the board meet only once every 
three months.294 However, the Senior Executive Committee of the board 
(Jomu-kai) meets very regularly and typically exceeds the monthly 
suggestion of Lipton and Lorsch as they may meet twice monthly or even 
weekly.295 Directors of keiretsu companies also meet twice a year for a few 
days in a hotel (most likely owned by a keiretsu member) where they 
discuss general corporate matters and socialize.296 Some keiretsu company 
directors may meet more often, such as the monthly First Friday meetings 
(Kinyokai) of the Presidents’ Club (Shacho Club).297
If measured against Delaware corporation law standards, the Japanese 
definition of “independent” director pales in comparison. A famous 
Delaware case, Orman v. Cullman,
 Corporate meetings, 
like Japanese academic meetings, are long, dreary and exhausting. Even 
with frequent meetings, there is a lot to be done legislatively and culturally 
if the plenary board is to perform a monitoring role. 
298
[I]nvolves an inquiry into whether the director’s decision resulted from 
that director being controlled by another. . . . [I]f in fact he is dominated 
 provides the best explanation of what 
independence means. In Orman, it was critical to determine whether a 
majority of the board was interested, conflicted and thus not independent. In 
determining whether the board was independent, the court said that such a 
determination: 
                                                                                                                 
to time constraints; and (g) selection of a Lead Independent Director to counterbalance CEO 
power. Now, Martin Lipton is complaining about some of the things he himself was proposing in 
1992. Though times have changed, Enron and Worldcom occurred, and Sarbanes-Oxley was 
passed, there seems to be some oddity to this. See Martin Lipton, Deconstructing American 
Business II, 10 Nat’l Legal Center for Pub. Int. 1, 2–6 (2006), available at 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26666/pub_detail.asp. 
 290. Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 179, at 68–69. 
 291. Id. at 69.  
 292. Id. 
 293. OHTSU & IMANARI, supra note 205, at 353. 
 294. Kaisha Ho [Company Act], Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 363, no. 2 (Authority of Directors of 
Companies with Board of Directors). 
 295. See OHTSU & IMANARI, supra note 205, at 350, 353. 
 296. See LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 143. 
 297. See generally MIN CHEN, ASIAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: CHINESE, JAPANESE AND 
KOREAN STYLES OF BUSINESS (2004). See also Brian Bremner, Emily Thornton & Irene M. 
Kunii, Mitsubishi: Fall of a Keiretsu (Int’l Edition), BUS. WK., Mar. 15, 1999,   
http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_11/ b3620009.htm. 
 298. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
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by that other party, whether through close personal or familial relationship 
or through force of will. A director can also be controlled by another if the 
challenged director is beholden to the allegedly controlling entity. A 
director may be considered beholden to (and thus controlled by) another 
when the allegedly controlling entity has the unilateral power . . . to decide 
whether the challenged director continues to receive a benefit, financial or 
otherwise, upon which the challenged director is so dependent or is of 
such subjective material importance to him that the threatened loss of that 
benefit might create a reason to question whether the controlled director is 
able to consider the corporate merits of the challenged transaction 
objectively.299
Japanese inside directors (and grey directors) are definitely not 
independent, as they are dominated by the appointing authority. They are 
current employees or subsidiary companies’ officers who can immediately 
be fired and whose benefits may be reduced at the discretion of the 
president of the company.
 
300 The president can also choose not to reappoint 
them the following year (with shareholder “confirmation”).301 While some 
may view Japanese directors’ objectivity as suspect, others argue that such 
objectivity does not exist at all. 302  Japanese directors are loyal senior 
executive officers before appointment, and are still employees after 
appointment to the board.303 Board members are not inclined to bite the 
hand that feeds them and are culturally bound to return the favor by 
unwavering fealty and blind allegiance.304
Grey directors are also typically dominated by and beholden to the 
company president. Grey directors include “former officers or employees, 
relatives of management, professional advisors to the firm (e.g. consultants, 
bank officers, legal counsel), officers of significant suppliers or customers 
of the firm, and interlocking directors”
 It would be unconditionally un-
Japanese to dissent from or contradict the opinion of management. 
305
                                                                                                                 
 299. Id. at 25 n.50 (emphasis removed). 
 300. Ryuichi Yamakawa, New Wine in Old Bottles?: Employee/Independent Contractor 
Distinction Under Japanese Labor Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 99, 113–15 (1999) (“In 
Japan, however, corporate directors quite often work as employees under the direction and 
supervision of top management, such as the company president or chairperson. In many cases, 
directors concurrently hold positions as employees (their business card may read, for example, 
“Director/Head of Sales Department,” if literally translated). Since not many directors are 
appointed from outside of a corporation, it is quite common that managerial employees get 
promoted to a directorship while continuing to hold the status of employee.”). 
 301. OHTSU & IMANARI, supra note 205, at 359. 
 302. See generally Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate 
Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 898, 919–20 (1996). 
 303. Toda & McCarty, supra note 22, at 205. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Joseph V. Carcello & Terry L. Neal, Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor 
Reporting 1 n.2 (University of Tennessee, Working Paper, July 1997), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=53917. 
 and are “closely aligned with [the 
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interests] of management.” 306 They often have some unwritten or latent 
investments and vested interests in the company. Therefore, grey directors, 
neither clearly independent or insiders, incline towards being insiders. As 
they have ties with management, they generally do not go against the 
wishes of the president or other offices lest they risk ruining their long-
running business relationships. They are not considered explicitly as 
insiders as they are not present or past employees of the corporation or any 
of its subsidiaries. However, they are absolutely dependent on pleasing 
management due to obligations made through their business dealings or 
familial relationships.307
Even with the institution of the committee system and the option to 
implement that system, the dilution of “independent” directors weakens the 
committee model. However, grey directors are not categorically bad for the 
Japanese corporation. An empirical study of the impact of the committee 
system through interviews with Japanese lawyers, auditors, ratings analysts, 
bankers and institutional investors reveals that outsiders are in fact almost 
always grey directors, and are rarely independent.
 
Accordingly, a majority of the Japanese directors could be classified as 
either insiders or grey directors. They are grey directors if they are: (a) 
directors sent by the Main Bank; (b) directors sent by suppliers, customers 
or business partners; (c) directors sent by the parent company; (d) statutory 
auditors; (e) consultants or external legal counsels; (f) former employees; 
(g) managers’ relatives; or (h) amakudari (both retired and soon-to-retire 
Ministry officials). While it can be argued that the amakudari are 
independent directors because they are not strictly grey and are employed, 
or were once employed, by the state, their agenda is typically centered 
around trying to secure an officer position for post-retirement, and thus they 
are unlikely to challenge management. 
308  The general 
conclusions reached by the study are five-fold: (1) most of the outsider 
directors are not independent; (2) it is extremely difficult to find a truly 
independent director in Japan; (3) outside directors do not improve 
monitoring; 309  (4) the distinctions between, and the advantages of, the 
committee system over the statutory auditor approach have been severely 
blurred in practice; and (5) as an exception, companies adopting the 
committee system that have listed with foreign exchanges or seek foreign 
investment may be valued higher by the market310
                                                                                                                 
 306. Id. 
 307. Amy J. Hillman, Albert A. Cannella, Jr. & Ramona L. Paetzold, The Resource Dependence 
Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to 
Environmental Change, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 139 (Thomas Clarke ed., 2004). 
 308. See Lawley, supra note 202, at 122–134. 
 309. See Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 188, at 1242. 
 310. This higher valuation is due to “the illusion of stronger governance.” Lawley, supra note 
202, at 133. 
 due to the familiarity of 
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U.S. and U.K. firms with the committee and monitoring systems. 311 
Auditors in the empirical study were also more cautious when auditing 
firms with grey outside directors.312
Because of their stake in the company, grey directors may actually be 
more incentivized to police management than independents.
 
313 Main Banks, 
for one, have successfully monitored companies effectively before and have 
intervened to remove underperforming CEOs and senior management 314 
who threatened the company and the keiretsu structure in general. 315
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine Japan without its insiders and 
grey directors. They are a significant part of the corporate culture and 
eliminating them or minimizing their presence to reflect the U.S.’s 1-to-9 
ratio of insiders-to-independents seems impossible.
 
However, though grey directors may have the incentive to monitor, it is still 
likely their interests are aligned with management. Independent monitoring 
may be more of the exception than the rule for grey directors. They are 
monitoring only to ensure their money is protected and for sound 
investment purposes, not because they are selected as professional monitors 
or equipped to serve as independent directors. Moreover, the danger with a 
grey Japanese director is that he has chameleon abilities—one will never 
know if he is white (siding with management) or black (siding with the 
monitors). The director can shift colors to avoid detection by the company 
president or active shareholders, or simply for convenience just as fast as he 
is appointed to the board. 
316
Becoming a mirror image of the U.S. corporate governance model has 
never been part of the Japanese agenda. Neither has entirely revamping 
corporate governance structures just to please U.S. and U.K. 
shareholders.
 They have been 
instrumental to Japan’s immense success. The government will not support 
such reform, the boards will certainly reject it, and the public at large will 
find it unreasonable. 
317
                                                                                                                 
 311. Id. at 122–34. 
 312. Id. at 126. 
 313. Id. at 116. 
 314. See generally Kaplan, supra note 41. See also Justin Wood, Director Duties and Creditor 
Protections in the Zone of Insolvency: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Japan, 
26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 139, 159 (2007). 
 315. Coffee, Jr., supra note 217, at 1300 (“Because the main bank holds an ownership level that 
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keiretsu as a whole.”). 
 316. See Tudor, supra note 253, at C2. 
 This should not come as a surprise because foreigners have 
 317. In fact, instead of totally borrowing Western ideas, they are spun into Japanese-style 
practice. Companies may even “borrow” an American physically and place him as an insider in 
one of their boards. American Jim Press, the first non-Japanese head of Toyota Motors North 
America, became the first non-Japanese director at Toyota. As a concurrent employee of the 
370 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
never been completely accepted in Japan. Their ideas have in general been 
regarded with suspicion and distrust, with some notable exceptions such as 
Japan’s embrace of the propositions of German professor Hermann Roesler 
in the 1870s. Thus, Japan will take slow, small, measured steps towards 
reforming the J-Form and its governance style. The Japanese will likely 
avoid appearing as if they are chasing the American form. As a 
consequence, any absolutely independent director hoping to institute change 
will face a steep climb, and the establishment of a truly independent board 
may still be decades in the making. 
IX. SWEEPING OR CREEPING CHANGE? 
Despite resistance, things are gradually changing in the corporate 
landscape. The Company Community, with all of its unique features, is 
slowly ebbing away. Furthermore, Japanese CEOs are increasingly reaching 
out to, and aligning their interests with, investors and shareholders. 318 
Shareholders, according to the 2005 Company Act, can propose that a 
director be removed and may actually resolve to remove a director without 
cause. 319  Shareholder activism led by homegrown activists, the Osaka-
based Shareholder Ombudsman, and the institutional investor Pension Fund 
Association is gradually being recognized.320 Foreign hedge funds such as 
Steel Partners, Perry Capital and the U.K.’s The Children’s Investment 
Fund are beginning to rock the Japanese corporate boat with either their 
aggressive or milder approaches to corporate change. 321
                                                                                                                 
company, he was an inside director. See Chris Isidore, First American on Toyota’s board, 
CNNMONEY, June 22 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/06/22/news/international/ 
toyota_american_director/index.htm. However, Mr. Press’s stint as Toyota board member was 
short-lived. Just a few months after his appointment, he defected to Chrysler and assumed the 
position of President and Board Vice-Chairman. See Dee-Ann Durbin, Top Toyota Exec Jim Press 
Joins Chrysler, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Sept. 7, 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/ 
is_20070907/ai_n19518579. 
 318. Xu Peng, Latest Development in Corporate Governance, RIETI, June 27, 2007, 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/projects/cgp/columns/04.html. 
 319. A shareholder who owns one percent or 300 shares in a company may propose to the 
company to remove its directors from office. Kaisha Ho [Company Act], Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 
305, no. 1. The shareholders may likewise resolve to remove a director by majority vote without 
cause. Kaisha Ho [Company Act], Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 339, no. 1; Kaisha Ho [Company Act], 
Act No. 86 of 2005, art. 309, no. 1. 
 320. Zenichi Shishido states, however, that outside shareholders (such as foreign, institutional 
and unaffiliated domestic shareholders) do not and cannot monitor management, and that the only 
recourse for them in case of disagreement is “by exit” or by selling their shares. See Shishido, 
Japanese Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 189, 205, 206, 208, 216. But this does not 
reflect contemporary corporate Japan since shareholder activism has been on the rise for the last 
few years, a gradual strengthening of institutional investors has emerged, and the occurrence of 
occasional confrontation with management in lieu of merely selling. 
 321. Sunrise? Japan is a Cornucopia of Great Business Names and is full of Promise in Terms 
of Mergers and Acquisitions. Yet, Japan also has a Habit of Disappointing. Could this be About to 
Change?, ACQUISITIONS MONTHLY, July 1, 2008, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-
8145072/Sunrise-Japan-is-a-cornucopia.html#abstract. 
 Their demands 
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include more transparency, payment of larger dividends, appointment of 
more independent directors, and the “promot[ion] and unlock[ing of] 
shareholder value through effective corporate governance.”322
Recently, corporations have come to understand that shareholders are 
an important constituency. However, they still have not embraced 
shareholder primacy altogether. The stakeholder-centered model, with the 
Company Community as a backdrop, is still the general philosophy adopted 
by corporations around Japan, with shareholder value merely as one of 
many objectives. However, instead of being the last in line on the 
stakeholders list, shareholder value has been promoted to a status equal or 
near to employees and customers.
 
323
Japan unquestionably has a long way to go to incorporate shareholder 
primacy. As Professor Osugi argues, Japanese corporations are generally 
ambivalent about shareholder primacy and seldom entertain the idea of 
adding more independent directors.
 
324 In agreement, Ronald J. Gilson and 
Curtis J. Milhaupt argue that Japan has merely imported U.S. corporate 
governance principles but has either failed to institute or does not have the 
much-needed resources to complement them.325 They believe that Japan’s 
“Americanized” board committee system is a formal—but not a 
functional—convergence.326  It is formal because Japan has imported the 
concepts of outside directors, board committees, and accountability 
principles, but does not have the complementary mechanisms and systems 
to make sure that these Anglo-American governance precepts are 
functional.327
American corporate governance forms have failed to reach full potential 
in Japan for three reasons. First, in Japan the full board has only ministerial 
and rubber-stamping functions, not genuine monitoring and supervisory 
authority. Second, there is no strong judicial review of board actions in 
Japan. This is unlike in the United States, especially Delaware, where 
boards are generally given deference to perform their functions even to the 
point of “expropriation of minority shareholder wealth” as long as 
independent directors (or committees) made the decision or it was an arms’ 
length transaction, in good faith and using good governance practices.
 
328
                                                                                                                 
 322. Subodh Mishra & John Taylor, Investors Focus on Pills, Pay Disclosure as Japan’s Proxy 
Season Begins, June 15, 2006, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2006/06/investors_focus_on_pills_ 
pay_d.html. 
 323. See generally LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 125. 
 324. See Osugi, supra note 173, at 158.  
 325. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 369. 
 326. Id. at 373. 
 327. Id. at 369. See also Ronald J. Gilson, Globalization of Corporate Governance: 
Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 331 (2001). 
 328. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 345, 370; see also, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 If 
the board has not done so, then U.S. courts, such as the Delaware Chancery 
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Court, will typically come down hard on the directors and rule against the 
validity of the board decision.329 If, however, the board was fully informed, 
reached the decision in good faith, and were not interested in the 
transaction, then U.S. courts will not usually disturb it under the Business 
Judgment Rule presumption.330 In Japan, courts may expeditiously agree 
that a board decision is valid simply because it was made by an “outside 
committee” without investigating whether it was truly independent. 331 
Third, Japan does not have a body of jurisprudence and doctrine that will 
ably support the transplanted three-committee/independent director 
system.332
Shareholders in Japan are gradually having a voice in the company. In 
the past, shareholders “either felt it was rude to question management or 
lacked an appropriate platform to do so.”
 More time and more experience with handling litigation or issues 
in regards to director independence will be needed. 
333 However, with the changing 
times, “[s]uch deference is becoming a thing of the past.”334 Shareholders 
are slowly transforming into empowered stakeholders who are demanding 
not only the right to be heard, but also change. Culture and endogeneity will 
play large roles in this era of change. Gilson and Milhaupt believed that 
culture, perhaps, plays too big of a role in the field of corporate governance 
and may very well hinder the necessary evolution of corporate laws and 
practice in Japan.335
What is happening is a hybridization of the post-war corporate 
governance structure with the U.S.-style model. Pragmatically, an 
increasing minority of Japanese boards will be reduced to ten-member 
boards in the years to come. The ebbing concept of the Company 
Community will be retained generally, but the shareholder will be further 
 Many hardliners still inhabit the corporate boardrooms 
and the government is still run conservatively. Nevertheless, Japanese 
culture can adapt to global corporate changes, if not gradually at first. 
                                                                                                                 
 329. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“The rule itself ‘is a presumption 
that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.’  
. . . Thus, the party attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the presumption that its 
business judgment was an informed one.”). 
 330. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (A court will not substitute its own 
notions of what is or is not sound business judgment since the Business Judgment Rule “is a 
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests 
of the company.”). 
 331. See Milhaupt, Speech, supra note 253. 
 332. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 369–71. 
 333. William Pesek, Jr., Barbarians Edging Closer to Japan’s Gates, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 27, 
2004. 
 334. Id. 
 335. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 361–63. These authors themselves believe that 
Japan is “slow to change but capable of enormous change once engaged” and that, following 
Newton’s First Law of Motion, its corporate governance tends to remain at rest unless compelled 
to change. Id. at 345–46. 
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promoted as one of the most important stakeholders. This will be pursued 
by the hedge funds and institutional activists currently investing in Japan, as 
well as the entry of newer homegrown shareholder activists such as 
Murakami and Horie. Reformists will push for more independent board 
membership, and they will be able to reach three or four independents out 
of ten directors in the coming years. There will be a further decrease in the 
number of insiders, notably managers, as corporate leaders realize that 
bestowing directorship as the “grand prize” to fiercely loyal employees is 
not always rewarding. This will allow many boards to be stripped of their 
operating functions and to take on a monitoring role. The weak statutory 
auditor paradigm will be strengthened to hopefully match that of the U.S.-
style audit committee composed of independents (unless the company has 
already chosen the committee system). Instead of focusing solely on 
growth, companies will also focus on profitability and shareholder return 
through dividends. As shareholders grow bolder and as more New York law 
firms enter and entrench themselves in Tokyo, it can be expected that there 
will be more shareholder resolutions and proposals, more mergers and 
acquisitions, and more shareholder litigation. 
Independent directors will have a rough time at first. They are expected 
to bow to the company president and the first few batches of independents 
will likely do so until they increase their numbers. In time, real 
independents, despite being in the minority, 336 will have the courage to 
constructively question and thus properly monitor the heavy hand of 
management. They will be able to say no, inter alia, if the executives are 
procuring excessive wealth from the company. It is almost certain that there 
will not be an independent board for at least fifteen to twenty years. 
However, once China dislodges Germany and eventually overtakes Japan in 
terms of the size of its economy, and large Japanese corporate brands begin 
to see lower incomes and profitability, then Japan may finally open up to 
the concept of a fully independent board. When that happens, they will 
determine that the concept of Company Community is obsolete and 
continue their shift to a more Western style of governance.337
                                                                                                                 
 336. Perhaps three or four directors, maybe even five, in a ten-man boardroom. 
 337. One thing is for certain: executive compensation will not generally be a problem for 
Japanese corporations. A CEO compensation that is too high or too divorced from the average 
sarariman (salary man’s) pay is something the Japanese cannot stomach. With the emotional 
attention of American media perennially focused on exorbitant CEO pay, Japanese chief 
executives will most certainly stay away from this ruckus for fear of being socially damaged and 
professionally ridiculed. See Kenji Hall, No Outcry About CEO Pay in Japan, BUS. WK., Feb. 10, 
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/feb2009/gb20090210_949408.htm. See 
also Yuka Hayashi & Phred Dvorak, Japanese Wrestle With CEO Pay as They Go Global, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 28, 2008, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122782362228562381.html?mod=todays_us_marketplace. 
 
The following list summarizes what may be attainable in the next 
decade or so: 
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(1) Downsizing the bloated board of directors to a maximum of ten 
board members for effective governance and decision-making; 
(2) Increasing the proportion of independent directors; 
a. At least three or four independents with six to seven 
insiders and grey directors, with the goal of eventually 
obtaining a majority of independent directors;338
b. Doing so gradually, as immediately and drastically 
reducing or eliminating insiders and grey directors will not 
work culturally, legally and pragmatically; 
 and 
(3) Increasing boldness of and monitoring by independent directors, 
peculiarly versus the President’s authority;339
(4) Increasing the length and comprehensiveness of board meetings 
(not a rubber-stamp board); 
 
(5) Holding roughly ten to twelve board meetings per year;340
(6) Strengthening the statutory auditor by making it truly independent: 
 
a. More active involvement during board meetings and 
arming statutory auditors with voting rights; 
b. Introduction of non-statutory corporate executives 
(corporate officers) who will deal with day-to-day priorities 
of the corporation;341
c. Providing statutory auditors with their own staff, budget 
and outside professional assistance; 
 
d. A stricter definition of independent statutory auditor; and 
e. The requirement of at least three statutory auditors for 
larger corporations, with all of them being independent; 
(7) Strengthening of the Committee System: 
a. Creating clear distinctions between the committees in terms 
of functions; 
                                                                                                                 
 338. In 2003, about one-third of sampled Japanese companies had appointed outside directors to 
their boards. See BEBENROTH & DONGHAO, supra note 282, at 25. This meant one or two outside 
directors for a 10-man board if they also chose to reduce the board’s members. This is bound to 
increase in the coming years. In contrast, in 2005, a survey of the largest public companies in the 
United States, uncovered that 81% of companies had boards comprised of at least 75% 
independents. ABIGAIL ARMS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES OF THE 100 LARGEST U.S. 
PUBLIC COMPANIES, IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2005: DEALING WITH THE GOVERNANCE & 
DISCLOSURE CHALLENGES AHEAD 3 (Practising Law Inst. Handbook, No. 6273, 2004), 
http://www.pli.edu/emktg/compliance_coun/Corp_Gov10a.pdf. 
 339. Company presidents in general have the exclusive authority to appoint and dismiss 
executives and even directors. See Poe, Shimizu & Simpson, supra note 252, at 85. 
 340. The law requires that the board meet at least quarterly. NEW JAPAN CORPORATIONS LAW, 
http://www.japanlaw.info/japancommercialcode/NEWCOMPANIESLAW.html. In some 
companies, however, the plenary board meets once a month but the board’s Senior Executive 
Committee or Jomu-kai meets twice a month or more. 
 341. This is intended to organizationally segregate the board from management so as to 
distinctly clarify the role of the directors and the managers. See Poe, Shimizu & Simpson, supra 
note 252, at 85. Moreover, the 2002 amendment allows for this. 
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b. Establishment of the Audit, Appointment and 
Remuneration committees composed solely of independent 
directors; 
c. Increasing adoption by companies to 250–350 listed 
companies; and 
d. Correction of the weak and loose definition of 
independent/outside directors; 
(8) Creating a clear dichotomy between operations/management and 
supervision/monitoring; 
(9) Increasing openness of boards to shareholder activism of 
individuals and institutions (e.g. the Pension Fund Association), 
and to ordinary shareholder proposals, dialogues and resolutions: 
a. Elimination of Shan-Shan shareholder meetings in which 
managers deliberately assign employees to clap as long and 
as hard as they can whenever a shareholder raises a 
proposal or to support management;342
b. Full eradication of the Sokaiya (corporate gangsters) 
menace; and 
 
c. Movement towards and cultural openness to a shareholder-
oriented model;343
(10)  Systematic diminution of the cross-shareholding system since “the 
rate of cross-shareholding has been slightly increasing;”
 
344
(13) Appointment of more foreigners (like Carlos Ghosn) to top 
positions;
 
(11)   Full implementation of the 2005 Company Law (Kaisha Ho); 
(12)  Increasing board openness to takeovers attempts, whether hostile 
or friendly; 
345
(14) Increasing director pay to the level of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development.
 and 
346
X. CONCLUSION 
  
The Japanese board is unlikely to reflect the U.S. board model anytime 
soon. The Americanization of Japan is unpopular amongst Japan’s older 
citizens, likely forestalling such a movement. 347
                                                                                                                 
 342. See LEARMOUNT, supra note 219, at 134 (“When the chairman announces the agenda, the 
employees clap and shout ‘we agree,’ so the chairman usually says that the agenda is carried – I 
think probably 70 percent of Japanese companies are still like this” in 2002.). 
 343. Suzuki, supra note 110, at 820. 
 344. See Osugi, supra note 173, at 161.  
 345. Miki Tanakawa, Imitating Mr. Ghosn in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001, §3, at 2. 
 346. To give Japanese directors more skin in the game; at the same time to serve as incentive to 
be informed, more responsive to shareholder concerns, and more professional in their approach. 
See generally Ira Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 BUS. LAW 1427 (1995). 
 347. See Hall, supra note 337. 
 However, the hybrid 
corporate governance form—particularly the reworked board of directors—
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will be reflective of many of the features of the U.S. model while still 
retaining some of the qualities of the post-war model. In that way, it will 
have a Japanese twist. 
A few years ago, it was feared that barbarians (a.k.a. reformists) were 
edging ever closer to Japan’s gates. It is too late: the barbarians are already 
operating within the gates,348
Will more independent and fewer grey directors speed the evolution of 
the Japanese board of directors? To a certain extent, yes, but it will take 
much greater time and effort for an overhaul to be completed. Impatient 
U.S. and U.K. interests may simply move their funds elsewhere or not 
invest at all. But in those cases, they will miss out on an excellent 
investment opportunity. The Tokyo Stock Exchange is still the second 
largest securities exchange in the world in terms of market value,
 and will open the palace gates for anyone 
wishing to enter the imperial grounds. Nevertheless, the barbarians are still 
few. 
349
As aptly written by a renowned Japanologist, “[it] seems unlikely that 
countries can embrace the shareholder supremacy norm for corporate 
activity without wholesale revision of deeply entrenched views and 
practices in other areas of society.”
 just 
behind the New York Stock Exchange. Moreover, it is undeniable that 
change for the benefit of shareholders is creeping up in Japan, and it is 
taking one careful step at a time. Are real changes forthcoming? Time and 
experience will be the ultimate judges. For now, changes lie somewhere 
between cosmetic reform and real reform. The corporate governance facade 
is being altered but it is still uncertain how deep the changes will go and if 
the corporate decision-makers will follow them. 
350
                                                                                                                 
 348. This raises some fears within the Japanese business community, much like how the 
Household International board was very fearful and uneasy with Moran not only being one of their 
directors but who was then exploring the possibility of a leveraged buy-out of the company by his 
D-K-M entity. Moran was a so-called “barbarian” who was not nearing the gates, but was a duly-
elected director inside the board. The difference was that the Household International board had a 
legitimate fear of an imminent takeover, while the Japanese may just be cautious of foreigners 
generally. See Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 349. The Tokyo Stock Exchange has a market capitalization of 5 trillion dollars. See Ayny, 
Tokyo Stock Exchange: 130 Years of Success, ECOMMERCE JOURNAL, Dec. 11, 2008, 
http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/articles/11824_tokyo_stock_exchange_130_years_of_ 
success. 
 350. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction, supra note 90, at 2126–27. 
 Despite recent changes, Japan should 
further legislate, implement and adhere to continuing corporate governance 
reforms, lest it be viewed that the independent director under the 2005 
Company Act is just a mere Potemkin Village. 
